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KIRSTEN K. DAVIS*
ABSTRACT
Using school involvement leave legislation as the focus for
analysis, this article proposes the “empowerment identity” approach
to work-family legislation as an alternative or complement to the
commonly used accommodation and antidiscrimination approaches.
In many households, working parents struggle to meet routine de-
mands of parenting, such as caring for a sick child or attending a
child’s school activity. Interestingly, one of the most common forms
of state-level legislation designed to address the routine demands
of parenting is school involvement leave legislation. Although state
school involvement leave statutes vary widely in how and for what
reasons they permit time away from work for parents to attend a
child’s school functions, they represent the common view that the
purpose of work-family legislation is to (1) accommodate episodic
parenting needs when those needs interfere with work obligations
or (2) prohibit discrimination by an employer when a worker-parent
requires time away from work to attend to those caregiving needs.
After analyzing existing school involvement leave legislation and
demonstrating that this legislation takes both accommodation and
antidiscrimination approaches to regulating school involvement leave,
this article suggests that an alternative approach to critiquing and
crafting work-family legislation, particularly school involvement
leave legislation, is the empowerment identity approach. An empower-
ment identity approach, adapted from organizational communication
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theory, frames legislation as a discursive structure in which worker-
parents should be empowered to construct individualized worker-
parent identities through language and related action. Accordingly,
after explaining the empowerment identity approach, this article
concludes that school involvement leave statutes, re-envisioned as
discursive frameworks for constructing identity, fall short of full em-
powerment but have the potential to empower parents to accomplish
plural, individualized, and authentic identities as both worker-parents
and as important stewards of their children’s educations.
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INTRODUCTION
Parenting in contemporary American society is subject to a
dominant narrative that tells a story of families where “mother”
and “father” have specific identities.1 Mothers are women who have
“opted out” of full-time paid work to engage in full-time parenting
while fathers are men who vigorously engage in the workplace and
whose workplace personas are unencumbered by family life.2 The
reality of the relationship between work and family, and the identities
of mothers and fathers, is significantly different in most American
households, however. The majority of children, in fact, roughly two-
thirds, are raised in households where mother and father do not
embody traditional identities: both parents or a single parent work
full-time and are also responsible for the day-to-day care of children.3
1. See, e.g., Naomi Cahn, The Power of Caretaking, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 177, 188,
194 (2000) (noting the myth and observing that “parenthood remains a highly gendered
concept in our culture, with different expectations for mothers than for fathers”).
2. See Judith G. Gonyea & Bradley K. Googins, The Restructuring of Work and
Family in the United States: A New Challenge for American Corporations, in THE WORK-
FAMILY CHALLENGE: RETHINKING EMPLOYMENT 63, 65 (Suzan Lewis & Jeremy Lewis eds.,
1996) (noting that the “guiding metaphor” for social policy in the United States is the
idea that women are at home with free time and can provide care to children); see also
JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER 14-20 (2000) (discussing prevailing “choice rhetoric”
where the marginalization of women as market participants because of their caregiver
status is the product of women’s choice); Cahn, supra note 1, at 192 (recognizing that
“women are still expected to devote themselves to the home”); Laura T. Kessler, Keeping
Discrimination Theory Front and Center in the Discourse Over Work and Family Conflict,
34 PEPP. L. REV. 313, 320-22 (2007) (discussing, and ultimately rebutting, the “opt-out
revolution” theory); Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2003, § 6
(Magazine), at 42 (describing women’s choice to opt out); JOAN C. WILLIAMS ET AL., UNIV.
CAL. HASTINGS COLL. OF LAW, “OPT OUT” OR PUSHED OUT?: HOW THE PRESS COVERS
WORK/FAMILY CONFLICT: THE UNTOLD STORY OF WHY WOMEN LEAVE THE WORKFORCE
10-29 (2006), available at http://www.worklifelaw.org/pubs/OptOutPushedOut.pdf (critiqu-
ing the dominant narrative of the “opt-out revolution” and offering a new narrative of
the relationship between women and work).
3. See JODIE LEVIN-EPSTEIN, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, GETTING PUNCHED:
THE JOB AND FAMILY CLOCK 3 (2006), available at http://www.clasp.org/admin/site/
publications/files/0303.pdf (noting that “[sixty-five] percent of families with children are
headed by two employed parents or by a single working parent”). The Sloan Work and
Family Research Network reports this number at seventy percent. Mary Curlew & Julie
Weber, School Involvement Leave: Providing Leave for Parental Involvement in School
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As a result, many parents experience conflict between their job re-
sponsibilities and routine parenting responsibilities, such as caring
for a sick child, taking a child to a doctor’s appointment, or attending
a child’s school function.4
In legislation designed to alleviate the conflicts worker-parents
face in managing the relationship between work and family, two domi-
nant approaches have emerged: the accommodation and antidiscrimi-
nation approaches.5 The accommodation approach views legislation
as a tool for mandating that employers accommodate the special needs
of parents so long as the accommodation does not create an undue
hardship for the employer.6 The antidiscrimination approach posits
that legislation should protect parents from being disadvantaged at
work as a result of caregiving obligations.7
Some states have enacted statutes that provide parents leave
from work to attend to “routine” parenting demands, such as the need
to care for a sick child, to take a child to a doctor’s appointment, or to
attend a child’s school activities; other statutes protect parents from
Activities, 2009 SLOAN WORK & FAMILY RES. NETWORK POL’Y BRIEFING SERIES, http://
www.bc.edu/wfnetwork/pdfs/policy_makers18.pdf.
4. See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and the
Limitations of Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 79, 86-87 (1989) (recognizing the conflict); see also JODY HEYMANN, THE
WIDENING GAP: WHY AMERICA’S WORKING FAMILIES ARE IN JEOPARDY AND WHAT CAN BE
DONE ABOUT IT (2000) (discussing working conditions, work-family disruptions, and the
consequences for caregivers and dependents across social classes).
5. See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private Process: Toward an Incen-
tivized Organizational Justice Model of Equal Employment Quality for Caregivers, 2007
UTAH L. REV. 25, 28 (noting that the dominant approaches to protecting caregivers in the
workplace have been mandated accommodation and protection against discrimination).
6. See Debbie N. Kaminer, The Work-Family Conflict: Developing a Model of Parental
Accommodation in the Workplace, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 305, 332-60 (2004) (describing the
accommodation approach based on Title VII religious accommodations); Peggie R. Smith,
Accommodating Routine Parental Obligations in an Era of Work-Family Conflict: Lessons
from Religious Accommodations, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1445-48, 1465-86 (same); cf.
Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, Women’s
Cultural Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 371, 457-59 (2001) (describing the accommodation approach under the
Americans with Disabilities Act). Others argue, on the other hand, that accommodation
and antidiscrimination approaches are overlapping categories and are not mutually
exclusive approaches. See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Commentary, Antidiscrimination and
Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 645-46 (2001) (describing the similarities of the
antidiscrimination and accommodation approaches).
7. See Joan C. Williams & Nancy Segal, Beyond the Maternal Wall: Relief for
Family Caregivers Who Are Discriminated Against on the Job, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J.
77, 79-81, 85-87 (2003) (articulating an antidiscrimination approach); see also Joan C.
Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of “FReD”: Family Responsibilities
Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and Implicit Bias, 59
HASTINGS L.J. 1311, 1326-30 (2008) (describing the need for an antidiscrimination ap-
proach); Kessler, supra note 2, at 320-22 (supporting an antidiscrimination approach).
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workplace discrimination based on these responsibilities.8 One of
the most common forms of this state-level legislation designed to
address the routine demands of parenting is school involvement leave
legislation.9 Twelve states and the District of Columbia have statutes
that provide at least some worker-parents with time away from work
to attend a child’s school activities,10 and over a dozen more states
have school involvement leave bills pending,11 as does the United
States Congress.12
School involvement leave legislation is somewhat unique among
the types of legislation designed to help parents with the routines of
childrearing. School involvement leave statutes do not address child-
rearing situations where parent presence is a physical necessity, as
in the situation where a child is ill and must have a caregiver pres-
ent. Rather, school involvement leave legislation facilitates parents’
involvement in an important but non-health-related, ongoing, and
typically outsourced caregiving activity: the child’s education, where,
for example, a teacher has the primary responsibility for the child’s
physical care and well-being at the time. By focusing on the auxiliary
nature of the parent as caregiver in this context, the school involve-
ment leave statutes uniquely recognize and protect the stewardship13
role of a worker-parent in the educational context.
8. See infra Part II.B.
9. See infra Part II.B., Appendix.
10. See infra Part II.B., Appendix. These states include California, Colorado, Hawaii,
Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee,
Texas and Vermont.
11. See SLOAN WORK & FAMILY RESEARCH NETWORK, BOSTON COLL., 2009 LEGISLATIVE
SUMMARY SHEET: BILLS RELATED TO SCHOOL INVOLVEMENT LEAVE RECENTLY INTRODUCED
INTO STATE LEGISLATURES 1-4 (2009), http://www.wfnetwork.bc.edu/pdfs/BillsbyTheme
_SchoolInvolvement.pdf (listing pending school involvement leave legislation (some
providing paid leave, but the majority providing unpaid leave) in Colorado, Georgia,
Indiana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas,
Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin); see also Curlew & Weber, supra note 3 (noting
pending legislation).
12. See, e.g., Family and Medical Leave Enhancement Act of 2009, H.R. 824, 111th
Cong., § 4(a) (2009) (includes provisions that give parents and grandparents unpaid
leave to attend school and community events involving their children and grandchildren).
13. A “steward” is defined as “[o]ne who manages another’s property, finances, or
other affairs.” THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1701
(4th ed. 2000). In the context of religious stewardship, the word suggests the grateful
and responsible use of common resources, behaving in a way that provides for future
generations, considering the impact of choices on others, exercising wisdom, and engaging
compassionately and with joy. See, e.g., The Episcopal Church, Working Definition of
Christian Stewardship, http://www.episcopalchurch.org/stewardship_3272_ENG_HTM
.htm?menu=undefined (defining “stewardship”); The Presbyterian Church, Stewardship,
http://www.pcusa.org/stewardship/ (defining “stewardship”). Here, the term “educational
stewardship” is used to suggest that parents work to manage their children’s educational
affairs and, accordingly, be responsible to use common educational resources wisely,
thoughtfully, and in an engaged manner.
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Importantly, school involvement leave statutes not only give
worker-parents time and opportunity to participate in their chil-
dren’s educational experiences, but the statutes are also discursive
resources14 for worker-parents to use to develop parental identities
in relationship to their employers, their children, and their children’s
educators. Viewing school involvement leave legislation as a discur-
sive resource for developing worker-parent identity means viewing
the law as a rhetoric,15 an institutionalized vocabulary that both em-
ployers and worker-parents draw upon to define themselves and their
relationships to one another.16 When work-family legislation is viewed
as a language constitutive17 of identity, a key question for scholars
interested in crafting effective work-family policy becomes how the
statutory language expands, limits, and otherwise communicates to
individuals opportunities for creating, enacting, and embodying cer-
tain identities, both descriptively and normatively.18 This article takes
up that question and contributes to the ongoing discussion about work-
family policy by offering the “empowerment identity” approach as a
language- and identity-centered perspective for crafting and critiquing
work-family legislation.
14. A “discursive resource” is a socially constructed frame of language that individuals
can draw upon to interpret their experiences in concrete contexts. See Timothy Kuhn
& Natalie Nelson, Reengineering Identity: A Case Study of Multiplicity and Duality in
Organizational Identification, 16 MGMT. COMM. Q. 5, 7-8 (2002) (describing discursive
resource). Here, school involvement leave legislation is a discursive resource for worker-
parents (and for employers and others as well) because the statutes are a language that
describes the relationship between work, home, and educational contexts that can be
drawn upon to help individuals make sense of their experiences as worker-parents in
those contexts.
15. JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF
THE LAW 28 (1985) (noting that law is a rhetoric, “the central art by which culture and com-
munity are established, maintained, and transformed” through language, a “constitutive
rhetoric”); see also Williams & Segal, supra note 7, at 113 (noting that “[t]heorists have
long recognized that law . . . is constitutive of who we are”).
16. Erika L. Kirby et al., An Organizational Communication Challenge to the
Discourse of Work and Family Research: From Problematics to Empowerment, 27
COMM. Y.B. 1, 14-15 (2003) (discussing how institutions provide linguistic resources for
crafting identity).
17. WHITE, supra note 15, at 28 (recognizing the constitutive nature of law).
18. This author’s descriptive and normative exploration of work-family law as a
constitutive rhetoric is ongoing. In an earlier article, this author explored the specific
meaning of “accommodation” as it is used in legal discourse and concluded that the term
has certain denotative and connotative problems when imported into work-family policy
discussions. Kirsten K. Davis, The Rhetoric of Accommodation: Considering the Language
of Work-Family Discourse, 4 ST. THOMAS L. J. 530, 550-55 (2007). This article extends
and expands that earlier work by not only critiquing the language of work-family legis-
lation but also by developing a communication-theory-based construct for evaluating
work-family legislation and applying that theoretical construct to the specific problem
of parental leave for school activities.
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Under the empowerment identity approach, work-family issues
cannot be adequately addressed by only prohibiting gender or care-
giver discrimination or accommodating worker-parents who cannot
conform their identities and behaviors to that of the “ideal worker” —
a worker who is available for work twenty-four hours a day, seven
days a week, who is on a continuous career path, and who is unen-
cumbered by family responsibilities.19 Instead, an empowerment iden-
tity approach focuses on how legislative language creates (or does
not create) an empowered identity for worker-parents, an identity
invested with both the responsibility and power to reconcile20 the
demands of work and family in a way that represents the unique,
fluid intersection of work and family for that worker-parent.
Part I of this article describes the prevailing misconceptions
and statistically supported realities of work and family in contem-
porary society; sketches the framework of existing parental leave
laws, including school involvement leave laws; and describes why
school involvement leave laws provide a suitable and unique context
for considering the question of work-family identity.21 Part II adds a
detailed, synthesized, categorical review of existing school involvement
leave statutes and distinguishes them from other types of parental
leave legislation.22 Part III examines the dominant approaches under-
lying work-family policy legislation, the accommodation and antidis-
crimination approaches, describes the critiques to those approaches,
and briefly demonstrates that the language of the school involvement
19. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 20-24 (describing the ideal worker standard); Williams
& Bornstein, supra note 7, at 1337-39; see also Arnow-Richman, supra note 5, at 36-45
(critiquing antidiscrimination and accommodation approaches); Kirby et al., supra note
16, at 16 (offering the critique that an accommodation approach is insufficient for solving
work-family issues).
20. “Reconciliation” is a term used in relationship to European Union efforts to
address the conflict between workplace and caregiving demands. Peter Moss, Reconciling
Employment and Family Responsibilities: A European Perspective, in THE WORK-FAMILY
CHALLENGE: RETHINKING EMPLOYMENT, supra note 2, at 20, 20-21. Reconciliation sug-
gests “an attempt to harmonize or bring together different activities or interests so that
they can be conducted with as little friction, stress and disadvantage as possible.” Id.
at 23. Reconciliation is a “dynamic process, in which an equilibrium that equally meets
the needs and interests of all parties is unobtainable yet constantly sought through a
process of debate, review, negotiation and conflict.” Id. This author finds this term to be
particularly useful here as opposed to “balance,” which is the typical term used to describe
the relationship between work and family, because “reconcile” suggests process, nego-
tiation, and harmonization, ideas consistent with this author’s earlier work. See Davis,
supra note 18, at 550-54 (suggesting “facilitate” or “negotiate” as possible replacement
terms for “accommodate” in work-family context).
21. See infra Part I.
22. See infra Part II. Other sources also provide summaries of pending state school
involvement leave legislation, see infra note 95 and accompanying text, and existing
legislation, see infra note 103 and accompanying text.
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leave statutes embodies the accommodation and antidiscrimination
approaches and is subject to some of the same critiques.23
Part IV outlines identity theory as developed in organizational
communication research on work-family issues and explains how
identity is discursively constructed in the workplace.24 This section
then discusses current approaches to work-family research and their
shortcomings and discusses a corrective proposed by organizational
communication scholars, an empowerment approach.25 Part IV then
synthesizes identity theory with the empowerment approach to offer
an “empowerment identity” approach to work-family regulation, an
approach that complements other approaches for thinking about the
regulation of work and family.26
Part IV then analyzes how worker-parent identities are empow-
ered or constrained in the school involvement leave statutes.27 Spe-
cifically, when school involvement leave statutes are viewed as a
discursive resource for crafting worker-parent identity, as a whole
they are not successful in empowering worker-parents to construct
identities that further the reconciliation of work and family life.
Often they create rigid boundaries between work and family, offer
limited resources for understanding one’s role as a worker-parent,
offer formulaic responses to individual work-family situations, and
speak with a managerial voice that limits the voice of worker-parents
in the process.28 By rethinking these statutes consistent with the em-
powerment identity approach, these limitations might be avoided.29
Ultimately, this article heeds the call to give more “attention to
the central role of discourse in shaping personal identities and in
maintaining and transforming institutional structures” 30 by exam-
ining law as discourse, by offering an approach that critiques work-
family legislation from the perspective of identity and communication
theory, and by reorienting our legislative approach to work and family
as one concerned with legal language as a discursive resource for
constructing individual identity. In addition, by explicitly offering an
empowerment identity approach as an alternative or complement
to the accommodation and antidiscrimination approaches, this article
explores and offers new ways of using law to extend greater dignity31
23. See infra Part III.
24. See infra Part IV.A.
25. See infra Part IV.B.
26. See infra Part IV.C.
27. See infra Part IV.C.
28. See infra Part IV.C.
29. See infra Part IV.C.
30. See Kirby et al., supra note 16, at 3.
31. See David C. Yamada, Human Dignity and American Employment Law, 43 U.
RICH. L. REV. 523, 539-44 (2009) (describing a “dignitarian” model for employment law
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to worker-parents and to positively transform the relationship be-
tween work and family for the benefit of employers, worker-parents,
and children.
I. POPULAR NARRATIVES, MODERN REALITIES, AND THE
IMPORTANCE OF SCHOOL INVOLVEMENT LEAVE LEGISLATION
In the modern economy, children with a parent at home full-
time to address caregiving responsibilities are a statistical minority.32
Rather, there has been a substantial uptick in the number of children
with no full-time stay-at-home parent caregiver.33 School involvement
leave legislation recognizes this reality by creating opportunities for
worker-parents to take time off work to participate in their child’s
school activities.
A. Popular Imaginations and Prevailing Realities of
Working Families
In the United States, our collective imagination about how work
and family should be managed is shaped by media accounts of affluent
wives who “opt out” of the workforce to care for children and provide
stay-at-home support for a working husband.34 In this version of
managing work and family, highly educated, married women with
employed, high-earning spouses, voluntarily, happily, and with relief,
trade demanding and well-paying careers of their own for equally
demanding and more satisfying35 but unsalaried work as full-time
that would seek to reframe the discussion of employment law issues from one of markets
and management to one of honor and respect for employees).
32. See, e.g., Curlew & Weber, supra note 3 (“The majority . . . of families with
children are headed by two employed adults or by a single working guardian.”).
33. See id. (discussing how the two-working-parent household has become increasingly
more common, leaving parents with less flexibility to take care of their children’s needs
and less time to address family concerns).
34. Kessler, supra note 2, at 320-22 (discussing, and ultimately rebutting, the opt-out
theory); Belkin, supra note 2, at 42-44 (describing women’s choice to opt out); WILLIAMS
ET AL., supra note 2, at 10-28 (critiquing the dominant narrative of the opt-out revolution
and offering a new narrative of the relationship between women and work); see also
WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 14-15 (discussing prevailing “choice rhetoric” where the mar-
ginalization of women as market participants because of their caregiver status is the
product of women’s “choice”). Additionally, this dominant view is heteronormative; it
excludes same-sex couples from dominant cultural narratives about work and family.
Kirby et al., supra note 16, at 30 (noting that “[h]eterosexual couples have the luxury
of being able to explain the need for a day off because of a sick spouse or child” but gay
and lesbian worker-parents may find it difficult to talk about work-family issues because
their relationships may not be “socially sanctioned”).
35. This view is reflected in recent popular writings. See, e.g., LAURA SCHLESSINGER,
IN PRAISE OF STAY-AT-HOME MOMS 23 (2009) (“While women find the transition from
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caregivers to their children. These mothers are available on a full-
time basis to address the needs of their children, their spouses, and
their communities, and they have the financial resources, supplied
by their husbands, to do so. Moreover, fathers married to those stay-
at-home moms are able and choose to dedicate the majority of their
time and efforts to advancing their careers and increasing the fam-
ily’s financial resources. At the same time, these fathers enjoy the
benefits of a “flow of family work” 36 from their stay-at-home wives
that minimizes the attention they need to give to managing the rou-
tine aspects of family life so that when they do have time, they are
able to enjoy the benefits of a well-managed family. In short, in the
traditional story, the boundaries between work and family are dis-
tinct and the identities of parents are stable, traditional, and unam-
biguous. The two spheres are independently managed by parents who
can, and desire to, devote their singular attention to that sphere.37
Although this story may hold true for some families in the
modern economy, the reality for many working parents is quite dif-
ferent than the traditional narrative. First, the idea that women have
willingly chosen to leave the paid workforce to care for children ignores
the fact that the conditions of paid work marginalize women as care-
givers and can make caregiving nearly impossible, thereby making
“choice” an inaccurate description of the situation.38 Second, the narra-
tive disregards men as primary, full-time, stay-at-home caregivers.39
Third, and even more importantly, the narrative ignores the modern
reality of dual-earner families, households with both partners work-
ing outside of the home for pay, who make up a larger portion of the
population than ever before.40 The presence of children within those
frenetic schedules and work environments to [stay-at-home motherhood] emotionally
jarring . . . most women who make the change ultimately find peace and happiness and
a profound sense of importance they didn’t anticipate.”).
36. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 20-24 (describing “flow of family work” as the immunity
a male worker has from responsibility for any caregiving or household responsibilities).
37. For an overview of the historical development of domesticity or the notion of
separate spheres, see Cahn, supra note 1, at 188, and WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 19-24.
38. See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 2, at 7 (highlighting the false nature of choice
in the context of being pushed out of the workforce to engage in full-time caregiving).
39. This invisibility in the narrative parallels research findings on the perceived
undesirability of stay-at-home fathers. One study from Yale University showed that
stay-at-home fathers are perceived as the “worst parent” among working and stay-at-
home mothers and fathers, are held in low social regard, and “are neither liked nor
respected.” Victoria L. Brescoll & Eric Luis Uhlmann, Attitudes Toward Traditional and
Nontraditional Parents, 29 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 436, 440 (2005).
40. ELLEN GALINSKY ET AL., FAMILIES & WORK INST., TIMES ARE CHANGING: GENDER
AND GENERATION AT WORK AND AT HOME 8 (2008), http://www.familiesandwork.org/site/
research/reports/Times_Are_Changing.pdf (“In 2008, 79% of married/partnered employees
lived in dual-earner couples — 85% of women and 75% of men.”). Those partners are also
working more, at home and at work. Over the last three decades, the total number of
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households has also increased. In the 1960s, 70% of families had one
or more parents at home full-time.41 Today, that statistic is nearly
a mirror image: 65% to 70% of families with children have two em-
ployed parents or a single parent who is employed.42 Thus, most of
today’s children are growing up in families where both parents (or
the sole parent in a single parent household) work for pay and cannot
devote themselves full-time to caregiving.43
In addition, mothers of children under eighteen have strikingly
increased their participation in the workforce over the last three
decades. In 1975, only 47% of mothers were in the workforce; in 2007,
they made up 71% of the workforce.44 This statistic is even more strik-
ing when compared with the changes in overall participation of men
and women in the workforce generally. Whereas mother participation
in the workforce increased approximately 24% since 1975, the number
of women overall in the workforce has increased by only 15% from
1950 to 2007 (from 42% to 57%), and the number of men participating
in the workforce has actually declined by about 16% over the same
time period (82% to 66%).45
Relatedly, the number of working fathers with identifiable respon-
sibilities at home continues to increase. Fathers report that they spend
one-third more time per day with their children than they did in
1977.46 They report doing more of the household chores like cooking,
cleaning, and childcare.47 Now that they have more responsibilities
for children and home-life, more than half of the dual-earner fathers
report experiencing work-family conflict, notably at higher rates than
work hours for dual-earner couples increased from eighty-one hours per week to ninety-
one hours per week. JAMES T. BOND ET AL., FAMILIES & WORK INST., HIGHLIGHTS OF THE
NATIONAL STUDY OF THE CHANGING WORKFORCE: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (2002), http://
familiesandwork.org/site/research/summary/nscw2002summ.pdf. In addition, the time
spent caring for children on workdays has increased by one hour from 5.2 hours to 6.2
hours. Id.
41. LEVIN-EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 3.
42. Id. (citing 65%); Curlew & Weber, supra note 3 (citing 70%).
43. Joan Williams notes that among dual-earner families, 64% of parents report that
they work more than eighty hours per week. JOAN C. WILLIAMS, THE CTR. FOR WORKLIFE
LAW, UNIV. CAL. HASTINGS COLL. OF LAW, ONE SICK CHILD AWAY FROM BEING FIRED:
WHEN “OPTING-OUT” IS NOT AN OPTION 8 (2006), http://www.worklifelaw.org/pubs/
OneSickChildovervu.pdf.
44. GALINSKY ET AL., supra note 40, at 4; see also Economic News Release, U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Employment Characteristics of Families in 2008 (May 27,
2009), available at http://data.bls.gov/news.release/famee.nr0.thm (“The labor force par-
ticipation rate . . . for all mothers with children under 18 was 71.4 percent in 2008.”).
45. GALINSKY ET AL., supra note 40, at 5. The statistics for men and women, generally,
begin in 1950 whereas the statistics for mothers in the workforce begin in 1975. Id.
46. Id. at 14 (noting increase in time spent with children from two to three hours per
work day). Fathers also report having more responsibility for childcare arrangements.
Id. at 16.
47. Id. at 17-18.
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working mothers in dual-earner couples: 59% of the fathers experience
conflict while only 45% of mothers do.48
In sum, the reality is that most children have parents who work
outside the home, who have responsibility for childcare at home, and
who experience conflict in addressing both.
B. School Involvement Leave: An Important Context for Legislation
In the late 1980s, the first widespread public policy discussions
about the needs of working parents, particularly working mothers,
to manage the demands of work with the demands of family life49
culminated in the passage of the Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993 (FMLA).50 The FMLA has been important in helping some
workers (those working a minimum number of hours, for at least
twelve months, for employers with more than fifty employees)51 man-
age family episodes,52 such as the birth of a child or the serious illness
of a family member.53 A number of states also have unpaid FMLA-
type workplace leave legislation.54 Two states, however, New Jersey
and California, have gone beyond the unpaid leave offered in the
FMLA and provide some workers in those states paid leave to care for
a new child or to care for a seriously ill family member.55 A similar
paid leave statute is set to go into effect in Washington in 2012.56
48. Id. at 19. For men, this is a significant increase over the thirty-five percent
reported in 1977. Id. at 18.
49. See Nancy E. Dowd, Envisioning Work and Family: A Critical Perspective on
International Models, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 311, 314 n.7 (1989) (noting that “[w]ork-
family issues . . . first became a national campaign issue in the 1988
presidential election”).
50. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2006).
51. Id. § 2611(2), (4) (defining employee and employer).
52. This author uses the term “episode” because the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA) treats family demands as intermittent, episodic disruptions to an individual
worker’s commitment to the workplace. See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 6, at 424 (noting
that the “FMLA does little to address the everyday leave needs of caregivers”); Katharine
B. Silbaugh, Is the Work-Family Conflict Pathological or Normal Under the FMLA? The
Potential of the FMLA to Cover Ordinary Work-Family Conflicts, 15 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 193, 195 (2004) (noting the “emergency” character of FMLA). A different view of
regulating parental obligations in terms of the workplace, suggested here and elsewhere,
would be to treat the demands of dependency relationships, such as the relationship of
dependency that a parent has with a child, as ongoing and as valuable as those relation-
ships of paid service in the workplace. See, e.g., Maxine Eichner, Square Peg in a Round
Hole: Parenting Policies and Liberal Theory, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 133, 169 (1998) (noting that
work needs to be done “to insure that men as well as women recognize the importance
of parenting”).
53. § 2612(a)(1).
54. See discussion infra Part II.B.
55. CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE §§ 3300-3306 (West Supp. 2010); Temporary Disability
Benefits Law, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 43:21-25 to 21-31 (West 2010).
56. WASH REV. CODE §§ 49.86.030-.060 (2009).
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Additionally, a few states have recognized that worker-parents
need time to attend to not only episodic family obligations but also
to those routine obligations that can conflict with work schedules.
In those states, parents have legislatively guaranteed time off work
to care for children with common, non-serious illnesses, to address
children’s routine medical appointment needs, and to be involved in
children’s school activities and educational process.57
Of the state statutes that address routine parenting demands,
statutes that provide leave for parents to be involved in children’s
school activities are the most common form of leave addressed.
Twelve states — California, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, Nevada, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas,
and Vermont — and the District of Columbia have legislation guar-
anteeing to all or some portion of worker-parents the opportunity to
use unpaid leave to be involved in children’s educational activities.58
In those jurisdictions, parents are legislatively guaranteed a certain
number of leave hours per year, ranging from two to forty hours, to
attend a variety of children’s school functions, such as parent-teacher
conferences or extra-curricular events.59 These statutes vary widely
in the number of leave hours, the types of leave-eligible activities,
and the individuals who are entitled to the guaranteed leave.60
These statutes occupy a somewhat unique position among
parental leave statutes because the parental role is distinctive in
the context of attending a child’s school activities. The distinction is
that, typically, a parent’s role in school activities is as an auxiliary
caregiver who participates in or facilitates an educational opportu-
nity for a child rather than performs as a caregiver who has pri-
mary responsibility for a child’s care or supervision.61 For example,
57. See, e.g., infra Part II.A (discussing Vermont and Massachusetts leave statutes).
Vermont and Massachusetts also recognize the caregiving demands imposed upon workers
by other dependents, including elderly relatives. Accordingly, the statutes guarantee
time off from work to attend to those caregiving needs as well as to take elderly depen-
dents to routine medical appointments. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 §§ 470-473 (2009) (granting
unpaid leave); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 52D(b)(3) (2009) (same). The issue of leave
for elder care or other types of caregiving is important and should not be overlooked; this
article, however, focuses on the demands of parents in relation to dependent children.
For a good discussion of the question of regulating time off work for the care of elderly
dependents, see Peggie R. Smith, Elder Care, Gender, and Work: The Work-Family
Issue of the 21st Century, 25 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 351, 354 (2004) (reviewing
existing work-family laws and applying them to elder care issues).
58. See infra Part II.
59. See infra Part II. In Hawaii, two hours per child for up to two conferences per
year is allocated for state employees. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78-31 (LexisNexis 2009).
In California, forty hours per year is available for employees to attend a child’s school
activity. CAL. LAB. CODE §230.8(a)(1) (West 2003).
60. See infra Part II.
61. WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 34 (distinguishing between “lessons” as “opportunities”
for children and “medical appointments” as “necessities”).
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student-teacher conferences are not mandatory for most parents; a
child’s education continues whether or not a parent attends a con-
ference. Similarly, a parent is not typically legally and physically
essential for a child to participate in a school play or field trip; gen-
erally, a child is supervised by teachers, school employees, and other
volunteers during those activities, regardless of whether the parent
is present. Child neglect statutes demonstrate that this distinction
between auxiliary participation and primary caregiving is salient:
a parent who fails to care for a sick child might be prosecuted for child
neglect, but a parent likely would not be prosecuted for neglect be-
cause she did not attend a child’s otherwise supervised school play.62
Although attending a child’s school function generally would not
fall into the category of primary caregiving, some state legislatures
have found it important to mandate leave from work for parents to
attend school functions, because the value of parents participating in
a child’s educational activities is repeatedly demonstrated in social
science research.63 “[A]ctive parental involvement in a child’s education
62. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 11165.2 (West 2000) as an example of a neglect statute
that would not apply to a missed school play but would apply to a parent’s failure to
provide needed medical care or supervision for a child.
“[N]eglect” means the negligent treatment or the maltreatment of a child
by a person responsible for the child’s welfare under circumstances indi-
cating harm or threatened harm to the child’s health or welfare. . . .
(a) “Severe neglect” means the negligent failure of a person having the
care or custody of a child to protect the child from severe malnutrition or
medically diagnosed nonorganic failure to thrive. “Severe neglect” also means
those situations of neglect where any person having the care or custody of
a child willfully causes or permits the person or health of the child to be
placed in a situation such that his or her person or health is endangered, . . .
including the intentional failure to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter,
or medical care. . . .
(b) “General neglect” means the negligent failure of a person having the
care or custody of a child to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, medical
care, or supervision where no physical injury to the child has occurred.
Id.; see also Cahn, supra note 1, at 187 (“The familial zone of privacy is further limited by
laws governing abuse and neglect.”); Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing
the Legal Understanding of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385, 395-96
(2008) (noting that “parents have the rights and authority to provide caregiving as they
see fit” but “[t]he state may intervene into the family to usurp parental decisionmaking
authority only in limited circumstances, such as abuse, neglect, and abandonment”).
63. In 1994, the California legislature passed its Family School Partnership Act and
acknowledged that:
(b) The evidence is beyond dispute that parent involvement improves
pupil achievement.
(c) Pupils whose parents are involved in their formal education have better
grades, test scores, long-term academic achievement, attitudes, and behavior.
. . . .
(e) Parents represent the single most important citizen group in terms
of school support.
(f) The building of a network of parent volunteers to support children in
public schools is central to the well being of the community.
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is one of the most important factors in determining the degree of
success that a child will have in school.” 64 “Parental involvement is
critical to children’s educational, developmental and health out-
comes.” 65 “Children whose parents are involved in school-related
activities perform better academically, put more effort into their school
work, and maintain better concentration at school.” 66 Additionally,
“[p]arental involvement is associated with better performance in lan-
guage and mathematics, as well as social development, and appears
to decrease dropout rates.” 67 In addition, parental involvement in
low-wage families is disproportionately essential. One report noted
that “children of low-income families tend to need greater educational
support.” 68 Yet, even though the impact of parental involvement is
well-documented, a national study found that nearly seventy-five
percent of working parents could not rely on workplace flexibility
to meet with their children’s teachers.69
Family School Partnership Act, § 2(b)-(c), (e)-(f), 1994 Cal. Stat. 8287 (portions codified
at CAL. LAB. CODE § 230.8 (West 2003)).
64. Beth E. Schleifer, Comment, Progressive Accommodation: Moving Towards
Legislatively Approved Intermittent Parental Leave, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 1127, 1132
(2007) (citing CAREY OLMSCHEID, PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT: AN ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT
(1999)); see also HEYMANN, supra note 4, at 53 (noting that “[o]ne of the most important
factors affecting how children fare in school is parental involvement”); WILLIAMS, supra
note 2, at 34 (noting that “a correlation exists between parental involvement and chil-
dren’s school success”).
65. BARNARD CTR. FOR RESEARCH ON WOMEN, THE WORK-FAMILY DILEMMA: A BETTER
BALANCE: POLICY SOLUTIONS FOR ALL NEW YORKERS 7 (2007).
66. Wis. Women Equal Prosperity, Economic Sufficiency: Work-Family, http://www
.wiwep.org/TAP/WorkAndFamily (last visited Feb. 18, 2010) (citing Sharon Vandivere
et al., Indicators of Early School Success and Child Well-Being, CROSSCURRENTS, Oct.
2004, at 1, 1).
67. Curlew & Weber, supra note 3; see also HEYMANN, supra note 4, at 53-57 (discuss-
ing the beneficial impact of parental involvement); JODY HEYMANN ET AL., INST. FOR
HEALTH AND SOC. POLICY, THE WORK, FAMILY, AND EQUITY INDEX: HOW DOES THE UNITED
STATES MEASURE UP? 7 (2007), http://www.nationalpartnership.org/site/DocServer/McGill
_Study_2007.pdf?doc!D=1581 (“When parents are involved in their children’s education,
children achieve more in elementary school, junior high school and high school.”).
68. Curlew & Weber, supra note 3 (citing Press Release, CCH, CCH Survey Finds
Most Employees Call In “Sick” For Reasons Other Than Illness (Oct. 10, 2007), http://hr
.cch.com/press/releases/20071010h.asp); see also JEAN FLATLEY MCGUIRE & KAITLYN
KENNEY, GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CTR., WORKPLACE FLEXIBILITY 2010: FACTS ON SHORT
TERM TIME OFF 2 (2010), http://www.law.georgetown.edu/workplaceflexibilty2010/
definition/general/STO_FactSheet.pdf (discussing workers’ concerns over a lack of work-
place flexibility that would allow them time off to attend to children and family demands).
69. JEAN FLATLEY MCGUIRE ET AL., GEORGETOWN UNIV. LAW CTR., PROMOTING
CHILDREN’S WELL-BEING: THE ROLE OF WORKPLACE FLEXIBILITY 2 (2010), http://www.law
.georgetown.edu/workplaceflexibility2010/documents/FF_Color_CD_Facts.pdf. Another
study found that, as a general matter, seventy percent of employed parents reported
that they did not have enough time with their children. FAMILIES AND WORK INST., 1997
NATIONAL STUDY OF THE CHANGING WORKFORCE: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6 , available at
http://familiesandwork.org/site/research/summary/1997nscwsumm.pdf; see also HEYMANN,
supra note 4, at 53 (noting that “many parents lacked the paid leave and flexibility they
needed to take time from work to help their children with school problems”).
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The statutory recognition of worker-parents’ educational steward-
ship is important for ensuring that worker-parents have the necessary
flexibility to participate in their children’s education. Moreover, the
statutes make visible and legitimize workers as individuals with re-
sponsibility for a routine obligation of parenting: facilitating a child’s
educational success. By having these protections in place, worker-
parents can expand their identities as caregivers to participants in
the educational development of their children, as partners with the
school and its mission, and as auxiliary but critical stewards of the
educational process.
The next section provides a more detailed review of the existing
state school involvement leave provisions that regulate the partici-
pation of worker-parents in students’ school activities.
II. SCHOOL INVOLVEMENT LEAVE LEGISLATION: LEGALLY
RECOGNIZING THE EDUCATIONAL STEWARDSHIP OF
WORKER-PARENTS
A. Overview of Existing Leave Policies Related to
Parental Caregiving
School involvement leave legislation at the state level is the re-
sult of regulatory gap-filling in the only significant piece of federal
parental leave legislation, the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
(FMLA).70 In fact, the FMLA has been specifically criticized for its
failure to address the routine demands of raising children, such as
needing time off from work to attend school functions,71 and instead
having an emergency or crisis view of parenting, demonstrated by
extending leave and discrimination protection to parents only when
parents need leave to handle an extraordinary family event or a family
medical crisis.72 Specifically, the FMLA gives some worker-parents
70. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2006).
71. See, e.g., Peggie R. Smith, Parental-Status Employment Discrimination: A Wrong
in Need of a Right?, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 569, 615 (2002) (noting that the FMLA
provides “no protection for the many routine parental obligations and exigencies that
most commonly clash with work demands”); see also HEYMANN, supra note 4, at 24
(noting that a study of working families showed that the FMLA covered only a “small
fraction” of leave needs).
72. For examples of scholars recognizing the emergency or crisis nature of the FMLA,
see Silbaugh, supra note 52, at 196 (noting the crisis or emergency nature of FMLA) and
Kessler, supra note 6, at 424 (noting that the FMLA does not reach routine demands
of caregiving).
The quality of the FMLA as a gender discrimination statute is a point of dispute. Both
the United States Supreme Court and Congress have characterized the FMLA as a statute
designed to remedy discrimination against women. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs,
538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003) (noting that “[t]he FMLA aims to protect the right to be free from
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up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave when children are born or
adopted into a family or when a family member suffers from a “seri-
ous health condition.” 73 Worker-parents who qualify for FMLA leave
are those who have worked at least 1250 hours in the last year for an
employer with fifty or more employees.74
Some states have statutes that also provide FMLA-type leave to
employees.75 All but three states offer this crisis event leave unpaid
to employees of private employers. Currently, California and New
Jersey provide paid FMLA-type family and medical leave, admin-
istered through the states’ disability insurance programs,76 and in
October 2012, Washington will begin providing paid family leave.77
gender-based discrimination in the workplace”); 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(4) (2006) (stating
that the goal of the act is to “minimize[ ] the potential for employment discrimination on
the basis of sex”). Others note, however, that even though the FMLA has been charac-
terized as a statute that provides relief from gender discrimination because the statute
covers childbirth and emergency medical situations, it does little to redefine the way in
which everyday caregiving is gendered and borne primarily by women. See Smith, supra
note 71, at 617 (noting that the FMLA addresses caregiving within “gendered norms and
assumptions” about women as caretakers). In fact, although women continue to be greater
contributors to the overall financial earnings of the household, they still bear the greater
amount of caregiving duties in dual-earner families. GALINSKY ET AL., supra note 40, at
8-9. Others reject the notion that the FMLA is an antidiscrimination statute at all. See,
e.g., Smith, supra note 71, at 614 (noting that “the FMLA is not an anti-discrimination
statute but a labor standard statute” that “functions in a manner that is different from
anti-discrimination statutes” because it imposes “an affirmative duty to help workers
harmonize work and family”).
73. § 2612(a)(1)(D).
74. § 2611(2)(A)(ii), (4)(A).
75. For examples of statutes that require private employers to provide FMLA-type
leave, see CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 31-51ll(a) to -51pp (2009) (requiring sixteen weeks leave
every two years for birth or adoption of a child or serious illness of a family member); HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 398-3 to -10 (2009) (requiring four weeks leave per year for birth, adoption,
or serious illness of a family member); and ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 843-844 (2009)
(requiring ten weeks of leave every two years for birth, adoption, or serious illness of
a family member). For comprehensive listings of FMLA-type state leave provisions, see
WORKPLACE FLEXIBILITY 2010, STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO UNPAID, JOB-PROTECTED
EXTENDED TIME OFF LAWS (2006), http://www.law.georgetown.edu/workplaceflexibility
2010/definition/documents/state_FMLA_chart_FINAL.pdf, and NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE AND FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE LAWS THAT DIFFER FROM THE
FEDERAL FMLA (2008), http://www.ncsl.org/print/employ/fam-medleave.pdf (providing an
overview of state statutes that allow for leave benefits different from the federal FMLA).
76. In California, the Paid Family Leave Program gives all workers up to six weeks
partial pay to bond with a new child or to care for a “seriously ill child, spouse, parent
[or] domestic partner.” CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 3301(a)(1)(b) (Supp. 2010). New Jersey
provides a similar plan to its workers. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 43:21-25 to :21-31 (West 2010).
Both plans are administered through the state disability insurance. Id. § 43:21-28; CAL.
UNEMP. INS. CODE § 3301(b).
77. Washington’s statute will provide a benefit of $250 per week for five weeks
to worker-parents who take leave to care for newborns and newly adopted children.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.86.030 (West 2010); § 49.86.010 (definition of family leave);
§ 49.86.050 (duration of leave); § 49.86.060 (amount of benefit). The Washington legislation
is controversial, however. Although the legislation was to go into effect in October 2009,
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Other states have gone beyond legislation mirroring the emer-
gency-type leave available under the FMLA and instead have enacted
leave legislation that reach routine parenting obligations sometimes
described as “small necessities” laws.78 As a general matter, small
necessities laws give worker-parents (and sometimes other working
caregivers) leave from work to address three routine parenting obli-
gations not covered by the FMLA-type statutes: taking children (and
sometimes elderly relatives) to medical appointments, caring for
children (and other relatives) when routine but not serious, illnesses
strike, and attending a child’s school activities.79
Two states, Vermont and Massachusetts, have the most expan-
sive small necessities statutes covering the routines associated with
caregiving. In Vermont, the legislature recognized that “[w]hen em-
ployees have security about their employment and the well-being of
their children, parents, and other family members, businesses benefit
economically from increased worker productivity and stability.” 80
Accordingly, the Vermont Parental and Family Leave Act provides
“short term family leave” for employees who have worked an average
of thirty hours per week or more for any public or private employer81
to “participate in preschool or school activities directly related to
the academic educational advancement of the employee’s child, step-
child, foster child, or ward who lives with the employee;” 82 to “attend
or to accompany the employee’s child, stepchild, foster child or ward
who lives with the employee or the employee’s parent, spouse, or
legislation was passed recently that delays the effective date until October 1, 2012. 2009
Wash. Sess. Laws ch. 544. In January 2009, Washington House Bill 1160 was introduced
to repeal the paid leave statute altogether. H.B. 1160, 61st. Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2009).
78. E.g., Massachusetts Small Necessities Leave Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149,
§ 52D (Supp. 2010); see also BUSINESS & LEGAL REPORTS, SMALL NECESSITIES LAWS:
NEW STATE LEAVE REQUIREMENTS FOR EMPLOYERS 9 (2001) (noting that “[t]hese statutes
go by a number of different official names, but are frequently referred to collectively as
‘small necessities laws,’ a term originating from Massachusetts”).
79. See e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 472a (2010); see also BUSINESS & LEGAL REPORTS,
supra note 78 (describing purposes of small necessities laws).
80. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 470(b) (2010).
81. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 471(3) (2010). On the face of the statute, the definition
of “employer” for purposes of the short term leave statute is unclear. Although Vermont’s
FMLA-type parental and family leave statute applies to employers that have a minimum
number of employees, ten for parental leave and fifteen for family leave, working an
average of thirty hours a week, id. § 471(1), the statute does not specifically state the
minimum number of employees an employer must have to be subject to the short term
leave provision. Id. § 472a(a). The short term leave provision has been interpreted to
apply to employers with fifteen or more employees, similar to the family leave provisions.
See GOVERNOR’S COMM’N ON WOMEN, FEDERAL FAMILY & MEDICAL LEAVE ACT V. STATE
PARENTAL & FAMILY LEAVE ACT, available at http://www.atg.state.vt.us/assets/files/
Table%20Compairing%20Vermont%20and%20Federal%20Family%20Leave%20Laws.pdf.
82. § 472a(a)(1).
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parent-in-law to routine medical or dental appointments;” 83 to
take a “parent, spouse, or parent-in-law” to appointments “related
to their care and well-being;” 84 and “[t]o respond to a medical emer-
gency involving the employee’s child, stepchild, foster child or ward
who lives with the employee or the employee’s parent, spouse, or
parent-in-law.” 85 The leave is limited to no more than four hours in
a thirty day period and no more than twenty-four hours in a twelve
month period.86
Under the similar Massachusetts Small Necessities Leave Act,87
an employee who has worked more than 1250 hours in the last twelve
months for an employer who has fifty or more employees88 is “entitled
to a total of [twenty-four] hours of leave during any [twelve]-month
83. Id. § 472a(a)(2).
84. Id. § 472a(a)(3).
85. Id. § 472a(a)(4). Interestingly, the statute uses the word “emergency” to describe
the conditions under which short term leave can be taken, although the statute appears
to reach routine illnesses and the caregiving needs required by those illnesses, because
short term leave is separate from the leave for a “serious illness” described in the statute.
Id. § 471(5).
86. Id. § 472a(a)(4). The difference between the amount of time available for leave
for serious illnesses covered by FMLA-type statutes (typically multiple weeks) and leave
for routine illnesses covered by small necessities laws demonstrates that there may be
a gap for parents when dealing with a child’s illness that keeps the child out of school
or day care for a few days at a time. For example, if a child has a cold with a fever, a
parent may need to stay home for a few days with the child. A parent in Vermont would
quickly exceed the four-hours-in-thirty-days maximum under the short-time leave statute,
but likely would not qualify for FMLA-type leave for “serious illness[es].” See id. §471(5)
(defining “serious illness” as “accident, disease or physical or mental condition that . . .
poses imminent danger of death; . . . requires inpatient care in a hospital; or . . . requires
continuing in-home care under the direction of a physician”).
Some states, however, have enacted legislation to fill that gap for some working parents.
California provides that if an employee receives paid sick leave, up to half of that sick
leave may be used to care for ill family members. CAL. LAB. CODE § 233 (West 2010).
Minnesota provides that “[a]n employee may use personal sick leave benefits” to care
for an ill child for “reasonable periods as the employee’s attendance with the child may
be necessary.” MINN. STAT. § 181.9413 (2009). Oregon provides that the twelve weeks of
unpaid family leave available to employees for the care of adopted children, newborns,
and relatives with serious illnesses is also available for the “care [of] . . . a child of the
employee who is suffering from an illness, injury or condition that is not a serious health
condition but that requires home care.” OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.159(1)(d) (2007). In
Washington, if an employee is entitled to “sick leave or other paid time off,” then that
time can be used to care for a child’s “health condition that requires treatment or super-
vision.” WASH. REV. CODE § 49.12.270(1) (2010). The legislative findings of the Washington
statute note that because of increased numbers of “working mothers, single parent house-
holds, and dual career families[,]” the “needs of families must be balanced with the
demands of the workplace to promote family stability and economic security.” 1988
Wash. Legis. Service ch. 236.
87. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 52D (West Supp. 2009).
88. In Massachusetts, eligible employees are those employees who can receive benefits
under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act. Id. § 52D(a). An eligible employee is
defined in the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A) (2006).
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period, in addition to leave available under the federal act” to attend
“school activities directly related to the educational advancement of
a son or daughter,” 89 to take the “son or daughter . . . to routine med-
ical or dental appointments,” 90 and to take “an elderly relative . . .
to routine medical or dental appointments” or to other professional
services appointments.91
While Vermont and Massachusetts have the most expansive
laws protecting routine caregiving, other states most frequently pro-
tect school involvement. For example, whereas only Vermont and
Massachusetts provide leave for routine medical appointments, nine
states — California, Colorado, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota,
North Carolina, Nevada, Rhode Island, and Vermont — and the
District of Columbia have either statutes mandating that worker-
parents in both public and private workplaces have a certain number
of hours of leave from work to be involved in a child’s school activities,
or statutes protecting worker-parents from being terminated if they
must attend certain types of school activities during the work day.92
Three states, Hawaii, Tennessee, and Texas, extend school involve-
ment leave to state employees but not to private employees.93 At least
one state, Louisiana, permits but does not require employers to give
89. § 52D(b)(1). The statute gives two examples of such activities: “parent-teacher con-
ferences or interviewing for a new school.” Id. “School” includes not only private and public
elementary and secondary schools but also licensed child care facilities, allowing parents
to be involved in the school-related activities of preschool-age children. Id. § 52D(a).
90. Id. § 52D(b)(2). These routine appointments include “check-ups or
vaccinations.” Id.
91. Id. § 52D(b)(3). “Professional services” must be “related to the elder’s care,” and can
include appointments for things such as “interviewing at nursing or group homes.” Id.
92. For a description of some of these statutes, organized by state, see NAT’L P’SHIP
FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, LEAVE FOR PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT IN SCHOOL ACTIVITIES 1-3
(2009), available at http://www.nationalpartnership.org/site/DocServer/School_Leave
_FINAL_2009.pdf.
Interestingly, an employee working for a private employer is more likely to be guar-
anteed time off work for bone marrow and organ donation than to have time off work
to deal with a child’s routine illnesses. For example, in Connecticut, an employee can
receive up to twenty-four weeks off work over two years to be an organ or bone marrow
donor. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 5-248a(a) (2007). In Maine, ten weeks over two years is allowed
for organ donation. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, §§ 843-844 (2007). In Minnesota, forty
hours can be taken each year to donate bone marrow or organs. MINN. STAT. §§ 181.945,
181.9456 (2009). In Louisiana, employers with twenty or more employees are required
to give up to forty hours of a paid leave of absence to an employee who undergoes a pro-
cedure to donate bone marrow. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.124(B) (2009). At least four
more states — New York, Virginia, South Carolina, and Arkansas — have bone marrow
or organ donation leave statutes. See National Conference of State Legislatures, State
Leave Laws Related to Medical Donors, http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=13383
(last visited Jan. 13, 2010) (describing state statutes).
93. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 78-31 (LexisNexis 2009) (codified in public
employees title); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-7001 (2009); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 661.206
(Vernon 2004).
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worker-parents time off work to attend a child’s school activity.94
Additional state legislation is pending throughout the country.95 The
existing state legislation96 is analyzed below.
B. School Involvement Leave Legislation — A Topical Analysis
School involvement leave is generally unpaid leave when avail-
able to both public and private employees (but is more often paid leave
in states where such leave is available only to public employees)97
and guarantees parents time off work to attend the school activities
of their children. The statutes, however, vary widely regarding how
“school activity,” “parent,” and “child” are defined;98 the amount of
leave given;99 the limitations an employer can impose on the process
for getting leave;100 the employee’s documentation and notice re-
quirements for leave;101 and the obligations of a school relative to the
leave.102 The statutes are classified below and analyzed according to
these topics. For readers who are interested in seeing much of this
same information compiled in a state by state format, the Appendix
contains a table that details these key topics of school involvement
leave legislation by state.103
94. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1015.2(A) (2009).
95. The Sloan Work and Family Research Network reports that fourteen states
recently introduced legislation to require school involvement leave. Curlew & Weber,
supra note 3. These statutes range from acts guaranteeing leave for any school activity
or for special events to those allowing leave for mandatory school visits, such as parent-
teacher conferences or special education meetings. Id. Two states proposed legislation
that would combine school involvement leave with leave for routine medical appointments
and caregiving, and three states proposed legislation that would give employers tax
credits for extending paid school involvement leave. Id. See also SLOAN WORK & FAMILY
RESEARCH NETWORK, supra note 11, at 1-3 (listing pending school involvement leave legis-
lation (some providing paid leave and employer tax incentives, but the majority providing
unpaid leave) in Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin).
96. States can also address school activities leave as an administrative law matter.
For example, Florida allows state employees to take one hour of administrative leave
per month to attend a child’s school activities. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. R. 60L-34.0051(7)
(2009). Only legislative action is addressed in this article.
97. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78-31 (LexisNexis 2009); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 661.206
(Vernon 2004). But see TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-7001 (2009) (statute does not state
whether the leave is paid or unpaid).
98. See infra Parts II.B.1-B.2.
99. See infra Part II.B.3.
100. See infra Part II.B.4.
101. See infra Part II.B.5.
102. See infra Part II.B.6.
103. For additional useful summaries of these laws, see A BETTER BALANCE, FACT
SHEET: EDUCATIONAL LEAVE 1-2 (2007), available at http://www.abetterbalance.org/docs/
Factsheet_EducationalLeave.pdf (describing state and local educational leave initiatives);
634 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 16:613
1. Protected “School Activities”
School activities for which a parent can take leave under the state
statutes ranges from narrowly to broadly defined. Most narrowly,
the definition of school activities is limited to conferences required by
a school administrator or to parent-teacher conferences. Specifically,
under California’s discipline leave statute, the first of two California
statutes guaranteeing worker-parents leave for school activities,104
a parent is protected from adverse employment action105 if that parent
is summoned to visit a student’s classroom for all or part of a school
day as required by a teacher who has suspended a student for statu-
torily defined behavior, which includes “obscen[ity,] . . . habitual pro-
fanity, or vulgarity” or disruption to or defiance of school officials in
completing their duties.106 Similarly, Nevada, under its emergency
or requested conference leave provisions, makes it unlawful for any
employer to terminate, “demote, suspend, or otherwise discriminate
against” an employee who appears at a conference about his or her
and NAT’L P’SHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES, supra note 92, at 1-3 (discussing state
educational leave legislation).
104. The California Labor Code provides leave for school activities in two situations:
(1) where any “parent or guardian of a pupil” is summoned to school because the pupil
has been suspended for certain statutorily-defined behavior, CAL. LAB. CODE § 230.7
(West 2010), and (2) to allow certain worker-parents to participate in a child’s routine
school activities. Id. § 230.8. Hereinafter, in the main text, the first statute will be
called the “discipline leave statute” and the second will be referred to as the “school
activities statute.”
105. These actions include discharges or threats of discharge, demotion, suspension,
or any other kind of discrimination “in the terms and conditions of employment.” Id. §
230.7(b). An employer who violates the leave statute must reinstate the employee and
reimburse for any lost wages or benefits caused by the employer’s wrongful act. Id.
Discrimination or retaliation claims are to be brought before the Division of Labor
Standards Enforcement. Id. § 230(f)(1). The Division reports, however, that only four
claims were brought under this section between 2002 and 2007. DIV. OF LABOR STANDARDS
ENFORCEMENT, CAL. DEP’T OF INDUS. RELATIONS, 2002 DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINT REPORT
(LABOR CODE § 98.75) Exhibit A; DIV. OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT, CAL. DEP’T
OF INDUS. RELATIONS, 2003 DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINT REPORT (LABOR CODE § 98.75)
Exhibit A ; DIV. OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT, CAL. DEP’T OF INDUS. RELATIONS,
2004 DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINT REPORT (LABOR CODE § 98.75) Exhibit A; DIV. OF LABOR
STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT, CAL. DEP’T OF INDUS. RELATIONS, 2005 DISCRIMINATION
COMPLAINT REPORT (LABOR CODE § 98.75) Exhibit A; DIV. OF LABOR STANDARDS
ENFORCEMENT, CAL. DEP’T OF INDUS. RELATIONS, 2006 DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINT
REPORT (LABOR CODE § 98.75) Exhibit A; DIV. OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT, CAL.
DEP’T OF INDUS. RELATIONS, 2007 DISCRIMINATION COMPLAINT REPORT (LABOR CODE §
98.75) Exhibit A. These reports are all available online at http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/
DLSEReports.htm.
106. § 230.7(a); see also CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900(i),(k) (West 2010) (defining types
of behavior). Schools are not required to have this policy, however. The statute states
that the “governing board of each school district” may adopt a parental attendance policy.
Id. § 48900.1(a).
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child requested by a school administrator or who is notified at work
that there is an emergency regarding the child.107
Other states also limit “school activity” to parent-teacher con-
ferences, but they do not limit them to required conferences or to
emergencies. In Hawaii and Texas, for example, where only state
employees are entitled to leave, the definition of school activity is lim-
ited to parent-teacher conferences but there is no mention of whether
the conferences can be voluntary or mandatory.108 For Hawaii, school
includes public and private kindergarten through twelfth grade
schools and licensed child care facilities.109 For Texas, school is lim-
ited to grades “from prekindergarten through [twelfth] grade.”110 In
Colorado, leave is limited to “[a]cademic activit[ies],” which are defined
as “meetings or conferences” that include parent-teacher conferences
and a narrow class of statutorily defined meetings, which address
special education, intervention, “dropout prevention[,] attendance[,]
truancy[,] or disciplinary issues.”111
Illinois expands “activities” to mean not only parent-teacher
conferences but also classroom activities related to an employee’s
child “enrolled in a primary or secondary public or private school”
that is in Illinois or in a state that borders Illinois.112 In California,
Rhode Island, Minnesota, and Nevada, the definition expands from
the classroom to school activities more generally. Under California’s
school activities leave statute, the second of two school involvement
leave statutes in California, parents cannot be penalized113 for taking
leave to “participate in activities of the [kindergarten to grade twelve]
107. Act effective Aug. 15, 2009, ch. 292, 2009 Nev. Stat. 1246. Similar to California,
Nevada has two types of school involvement leave. The first is for emergencies or
requested conferences, and the leave is available for all worker-parents. Id. The second
is for parent-teacher conferences and other types of school-related activities and is for
only a particular subset of worker-parents. Id. Hereinafter, in the main text, the first
type of leave will be called “emergency or requested leave” and the second will be
referred to as “school activities leave.”
108. The Hawaii statute was enacted in 2003, and the Texas statute took effect
in 1997. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78-31(1), (2) (LexisNexis 2010); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 661.206(a), (b) (Vernon 2004).
109. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78-31 (LexisNexis 2010).
110. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 661.206 (Vernon 2004).
111. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-13.3-102(1) (2009).
112. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 147/10(c), 147/15 (West 2008). In Illinois an “employer
who violates this Act is guilty of a petty offense and may be fined not more than $100
for each offense.” Id. 147/45.
113. Employees discharged or discriminated against in violation of the statute are
“entitled to reinstatement and reimbursement for lost wages and work benefits.” CAL.
LAB. CODE § 230.8(d) (West 2010). Between 2002 and 2007, employees made eighteen
claims of retaliation or discrimination with the California Division of Labor Standards
Enforcement under the school activities statute. See supra note 105 (providing enforce-
ment statistics).
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school or licensed child day care facility of any of his or her chil-
dren.”114 A similar definition is applied in Rhode Island where
employers are prohibited from interfering with leave for a worker-
parent to attend a child’s “school conferences or other school-related
activities.”115 In Minnesota, leave is permitted for worker-parents
to “attend school conferences or school-related activities related to
the employee’s child.”116 Both Illinois and Minnesota require that
leave be taken only for activities that cannot be scheduled during
non-work hours.117 Similarly, under Nevada’s school activities leave
provisions, the statute includes parent-teacher conferences, “school-
related activities during regular school hours,” and “school-sponsored
events.”118
In Vermont and Massachusetts, the focus of leave broadens to the
category of “educational advancement,” although the parent-teacher
conference is mentioned specifically as an example. In Vermont,
parents can have leave to “participate in preschool or school activi-
ties directly related to the academic educational advancement of
the employee’s child . . . such as a parent-teacher conference.”119
Likewise, in Massachusetts, parents may participate in primary or
secondary, public or private school, Headstart, or licensed child care
facility “activities directly related to the educational advancement
114. § 230.8(a).
115. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-48-12(a) (2010). Employers may not interfere with the exercise
of school involvement leave, or discharge or discriminate against an employee for taking
the leave or for opposing practices that interfere with the leave. Id. § 28-48-5. To enforce
their rights under the statute, employees can bring a civil action for injunctive and
equitable relief, but not for damages. Id. § 28-48-6; Reid v. Citizens Sav. Bank, 887 F.
Supp. 43, 47-48 (D.R.I. 1995). In addition, they can file a claim with the Director of Labor
and Training, who can take steps to protect the employee’s rights. § 28-48-7. Employers
are subject to additional civil penalties for each violation of the statute. Id. § 28-48-8.
Employers are required to post a notice apprising employees of their right to take school
visitation leave and describing how the right may be enforced. Id. § 28-48-10(a). Employers
may face a fine of up to $100 for failing to post the notice. Id. § 28-48-10(b).
116. MINN. STAT. § 181.9412 subdiv. 2 (2009). The Minnesota Division of Labor
Standards and Apprenticeship is charged with informally investigating and attempting
to resolve situations where an employer may have violated the Act. Id. § 181.9435. In
addition, an employee can bring a civil action to recover damages, including reasonable
attorney’s fees. Id. § 181.944.
117. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 147/15 (West 2008); MINN. STAT. § 181.9412
subdiv. 2 (2009).
118. Act effective Aug. 15, 2009, ch. 292, § 1, 2009 Nev. Stat. 1246, 1247.
119. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 472a(a)(1) (2010). In Vermont, both the employee and
the state can enforce the short term leave statute. Id. § 474. The state can sue the em-
ployer for injunctive relief, damages, and court costs. Although the state can investigate
a claim to obtain a “voluntary conciliation,” an investigation is not required before filing
a suit. Id. § 474(a). An employee can sue his employer for “injunctive relief, economic
damages . . . attorney fees and court costs.” Id. § 474(b).
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of a [child] . . . , such as parent-teacher conferences or interviewing
for a new school.”120
Tennessee, interestingly, does not mention parent-teacher confer-
ences at all, but instead focuses on activities that permit parents to
“observe and understand” the educational process.121 The Tennessee
statute applies school involvement leave to activities related to the
“educational and teaching process at the school.”122 The statute spec-
ifies that this includes activities such as acting as an “educational
assistant, library assistant, hall monitor, recreation supervisor and
any other activity that enables the parent to more fully observe and
understand the school, the faculty, the students and the educational
and teaching activities.”123 Interestingly, the statute mandates that
the “parent’s participation shall be varied.”124
North Carolina and Washington, D.C., have the broadest defi-
nitions of school activity. In North Carolina, leave is available for
the purpose of attending and being “involved” in the child’s public
or private school, preschool, or childcare facility.125 In Washington,
D.C., the District of Columbia Parental Leave Act gives leave for any
“school-related events,”126 which are broadly defined as “an activity
sponsored by either a school or an associated organization” and in-
clude “a student performance such as a concert, play, or rehearsal,”
sports games and practices, and parent-teacher meetings.127 The
statute applies only when the child is a participant in or subject of
the event; if the child is a “spectator,” no leave is required.128
120. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 52D(a), (b)(1) (West Supp. 2009). The
Massachusetts Attorney General can criminally and civilly enforce the Act. Id. § 52D(f).
A criminal penalty of up to $500 is possible for employers that violate the statute. Op.
Mass. Att’y Gen. 98/1, 4 (1998), available at http://www.lawlib.state.ma.us/docs/small
necessitiesadvisory.pdf. Civilly, the Attorney General can seek injunctive or declaratory
relief, and an employee can institute a lawsuit seeking injunctive relief and damages
against the employer for failing to grant the requested leave, for failing to restore the
employee to the position or an equivalent position, or for discharging the employee in
retaliation. Id. at 3. If the employee prevails, he or she is entitled to treble damages,
costs, and “reasonable attorney fees.” § 150.
121. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-7001(b)(2) (2009).
122. Id. § 49-6-7001(b)(1).
123. Id. § 49-6-7001(b)(2).
124. Id. § 49-6-7001(b)(3).
125. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.3(a) (2009). In North Carolina, if an employer takes an
adverse employment action, including discharge or demotion, against the employee for
exercising his rights under the statute, the employee may bring a civil action within one
year to recover any lost wages or benefits and to be reinstated to the original position
as if he or she had not been discharged or demoted. Id. § 95-28.3(b), (c). The employee
bears the burden of proof in the civil case. Id. § 95-28.3(c).
126. D.C. CODE § 32-1202 (2010).
127. Id. § 32-1201(3).
128. Id. Employers who violate the statute must pay lost compensation plus interest,
an additional penalty described in the statute as a calculation based on lost compensation
638 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 16:613
2. Defining “Parents” and “Children”
Who counts as a “parent” or a “child” under the school involve-
ment leave acts often turns on the characteristics of the worker-
parent’s workplace, the relationship of the worker-parent to the child,
the age of the child, and the school enrollment status of the child.
In Hawaii, Tennessee, and Texas, all public employees are en-
titled to school leave.129 In contrast, in states where the statute covers
both public and private employees, a parent who can qualify for leave
under the statutes often has a job tenure, workplace size, or work
type limitation. In California, a parent qualifies for leave under the
school activities leave statute if he or she works for an employer with
twenty-five or more employees.130 Under the Illinois statute,131 a
parent who has worked at least part-time for six months132 for an
employer with fifty or more employees,133 and who is not an indepen-
dent contractor,134 qualifies for the leave. In Massachusetts, employees
meeting the definition of “employee” for the purposes of the federal
Family and Medical Leave Act, having worked for at least twelve
months for an employer with fifty or more employees, receive leave.135
In Minnesota, employees who worked at least part-time for public
and private employers of any size are entitled to leave, but independ-
ent contractors are not eligible.136 Under Nevada’s school activities
leave provisions, an employee can take leave if the employer has “50
or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more cal-
endar weeks in the current calendar year.”137 In Rhode Island, the
and medical expenses not covered by health insurance, costs, and reasonable attorney’s
fees. Id. § 32-1204(b)(6)(A), (B)(7). An employer is entitled to a reduction in the damage
award, however, if it “proves that the violation occurred in good faith and that the
employer had reasonable grounds to believe that the employer’s action or omission was
not in violation of [the] chapter.” Id. § 32-1204(b)(6)(C). Moreover, if the employer is the
prevailing party in the action, the employee pays the employer’s costs and reasonable
attorney’s fees. Id. § 32-1204(b)(7).
129. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78-31 (LexisNexis 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-
7001(b)(5) (2009); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 661.206 (Vernon 2004).
130. CAL. LAB. CODE § 230.8(a)(1) (West 2010).
131. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 147/1-147/49 (West 2008).
132. Id. 147/10(a).
133. Id. 147/40.
134. Independent contractors are specifically excluded from the Act. Id. 147/10(a)(2).
135. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 52D(b) (West Supp. 2009); 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A),
(4)(A) (2006). Employees are defined as those who work for an employer with fifty or
more employees working within seventy-five miles of the worksite of the employee re-
questing the leave. In addition, the employee must be employed at least twelve months
with the employer and have worked at least 1250 hours during that twelve month period.
Id. § 2611(2)(A).
136. MINN. STAT. § 181.940 subdiv. 2 (2009).
137. Act effective Aug. 15, 2009, ch. 292, § 1, 2009 Nev. Stat. 1246, 1247.
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leave can be used only by an employee who has been working at least
thirty hours a week, for a year, for a private employer who employs
fifty or more employees or for the state.138 In Vermont, an employee
who works an average of thirty hours a week for a year for an em-
ployer of fifteen or more full time employees139 can take family leave.
Colorado combines definitional limitations. In addition to using
the FMLA limits on the definition of employer, it adds that the
employee must be in a “nonexecutive or nonsupervisory capacity”
and must not be an independent contractor, domestic servant, sea-
sonal worker, or farm laborer, although a part-time employee can re-
ceive proportionally reduced benefits.140 Conversely, in Washington,
D.C., North Carolina, and under the California discipline leave statute,
employer size, job tenure, and job type do not matter; all employees,
both public and private, are entitled to leave.141
Beyond the job tenure, workplace size, and work type require-
ments, two states make being a parent for the purpose of school
involvement leave contingent on being summoned to the school for
a problem or emergency. In Nevada’s emergency leave provisions,
a qualifying parent is anyone who is the “parent, guardian or custo-
dian of a child” who has been asked to appear at a conference by a
school administrator or who has been notified of a child’s emergency
at school.142 Similarly, the California discipline leave statute applies
to employees who miss work during school hours to visit a child’s
school at the school’s request.143
The nature of the relationship of the employee to the child who
is involved in the activity, the child’s age, and the child’s school en-
rollment status also make a difference as to who counts as a parent
under the statute. Typically, when parents are defined, they include
natural parents, guardians and custodians.144 California also includes
grandparents who have custody of children.145 Washington, D.C.,
138. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-48-1(2), (3)(i) (2010).
139. VT. STAT. ANN. tit 21, § 471(1) (2010).
140. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 8-13.3-102(3), -103(3) (2009).
141. D.C. CODE § 32-1202(a) (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.3(a) (2009); CAL. LAB.
CODE § 230.7(a) (West 2010).
142. Act effective Aug. 15, 2009, ch. 292, sec. 5(1)(b), 2009 Nev. Stat. 1246, 1249.
143. CAL LAB. CODE § 230.7 (West 2010).
144. See id. § 230.7(a) (applying to a “parent or guardian”); id. § 230.8(a)(1) (including
parents and guardians); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-13.3-102(3) (2009) (applying to “parent or
legal guardian”); D.C. CODE § 32-1201(2)(A)-(E) (2010) (applying to natural parents,
individuals with legal custody, individuals who act as guardians, aunts, uncles, or grand-
parents, or the spouse or domestic partner of any of the aforementioned); Act effective
Aug. 15, 2009, ch. 292, § 1(1), 2009 Nev. Stat. 1246, 1247 (applying to “parent, guardian
or custodian of a child”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.3(a) (2009) (applying to “parent,
guardian, or person standing in loco parentis”); R. I. GEN. LAWS § 28-48-12(a) (2010)
(applying to “parent, foster parent or guardian”).
145. CAL. LAB. CODE § 230.8(a)(1) (West 2009).
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includes grandparents even when they do not have custody.146 In
Rhode Island, foster parents are expressly included in the definition.147
Vermont appears to require that the child live with the parent before
a parent is entitled to take time for school activities.148 Of all the defi-
nitions of parent, the District of Columbia’s statute is perhaps the
broadest. There, parents include natural parents, individuals with
legal custody of a child, individuals who act as a guardian even if not
legally appointed, aunts, uncles, grandparents, and anyone who is
married to any of these individuals.149
Two states have proposed legislation to expand the class of
worker-parents entitled to leave. In Rhode Island, legislation has been
proposed that would make the leave available for an employee’s
domestic partner to attend the activity of the employee’s child.150
Additionally, in 2007, a bill was introduced in Minnesota that would
expand the categories of employees that would be eligible for school
involvement leave.151 The bill proposed that the “parent or guardian”
employee could “designate a significant individual” who could also
take advantage of the school visitation leave to attend a child’s school
functions.152 The significant individual had to be someone who “re-
side[d] with the child and participate[d] actively in the child’s care
and upbringing.”153 The bill appears to have not made it out of com-
mittee during the legislative term.154
Some statutes expressly define “child” or “children” to designate
the employees to which the statute applies. For example, Illinois’s
statute specifically refers to adopted, step, and foster children.155
Some statutes apply to children of only certain ages or grade levels.
For example, the California school activities statute applies only
to children in grades kindergarten through twelve or in a licensed
146. See D.C. CODE § 32-1201(2) (2010) (including grandparent in the definition with
no reference to custody).
147. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-48-12(a) (2010).
148. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 472a(a)(1) (2010).
149. D.C. CODE § 32-1201(2)(A)-(E) (2010).
150. S.B. 2737, 2008 Gen. Assem., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2008).
151. H.B. 744, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2007).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Minnesota State Legislature, HF0744 Status in House for Legislative Session
85, https://www.revisor.mn.gov/revisor/pages/search_status/status_detail.php?b=House
&f=HF0744&ssn=0&y=2007 (last visited Mar. 26, 2010). Portions of this bill were incor-
porated into an omnibus education bill later vetoed by the governor on May 13, 2008. See
S.B. 3001, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2008) (omnibus education bill); Minnesota State
Legislature, SF3001 Status in Senate for Legislative Session 85, https://www.revisor
.mn.gov/revisor/ pages/search_status/status_detail.php?b=Senate&f=SF3001&ssn=0&y=
2008 (last visited Mar. 26, 2010) (detailing the omnibus education bill’s legislative history).
155. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 147/10(c) (West 2008).
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child care facility.156 In Illinois, leave is available for an employee’s
“child . . . who is enrolled in a primary or secondary public or private
school.”157 Schools that are covered by the statute must be within
Illinois or in states that share “a common boundary with Illinois.”158
In Massachusetts, the statute applies only to children in “a public
or private elementary or secondary school; a Head Start Program,”
or a licensed child care facility.159 Colorado is the only state to cover
homeschooled children; the ability of parents to attend school meet-
ings and conferences is expressly extended to those whose children
attend public and private school or are “in a nonpublic home-based
educational program.”160
Three states consider a child’s age as a prerequisite for leave.
In Massachusetts, “child” is limited to a “son or daughter,” who is
a person “under [eighteen] years of age” or over eighteen and “inca-
pable of self-care because of a mental or physical disability.”161 In
Minnesota, an employee’s child is defined as “an individual under
[eighteen] years of age or an individual under age [twenty] who is
still attending secondary school.”162 In North Carolina, children must
be “school-aged.”163
In Tennessee, Texas, and Hawaii, the states that extend school
involvement leave to public employees only, and in Nevada’s school
activities leave provisions, the focus is on the school enrollment status
of the child. In Texas, public employees who are parents of “a child
who is a student attending a grade from prekindergarten through
[twelfth] grade” are entitled to leave.164 For public officers and
employees in Hawaii, leave is permitted for a child enrolled in “a
licensed group child care center” or in “a public or private school in
grades kindergarten through twelve.”165 Tennessee’s statute applies
to “child[ren] enrolled in school.”166 Nevada’s school activities pro-
visions apply to any child enrolled in public or private school.167
156. CAL. LAB. CODE § 230.8(a)(1) (West 2010).
157. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 147/10(c)-(d) (West 2008).
158. Id.
159. MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 52D(a) (West Supp. 2009).
160. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-13.3-102(3)(a) (2009).
161. MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 52D(b)(1) (West Supp. 2009) (describing “son
or daughter”); Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2611(12) (2006)
(including age in its definition of “[s]on or daughter,” which Massachusetts has adopted
in its statute).
162. MINN. STAT. §181.940 subdiv. 4 (2009).
163. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.3(a) (2009).
164. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 661.206 (Vernon 2004).
165. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78-31 (LexisNexis 2009).
166. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-7001(b)(1) (2009).
167. Act effective Aug. 15, 2009, ch. 292, §§ 1, 3, 2009 Nev. Stat. 1246, 1247.
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3. Available Leave
The amount of leave available under school involvement leave
statutes ranges from an annual maximum of two hours per con-
ference per child in Hawaii (travel included)168 to no limitations in
California or Nevada, where the statutes are directed toward disci-
plinary problems and student emergencies.169 When a specific leave
amount is designated, California’s school activities statute provides
the greatest amount of leave; an employee can take up to 40 hours per
year of school involvement leave.170 In Massachusetts and Vermont,
employees can take up to twenty-four hours per year, but those hours
must be shared with time off for other “small necessities,” including
children’s doctor’s visits and elder care obligations.171 Washington,
D.C., on the other hand, makes twenty-four hours of leave available
for school visits alone.172 Colorado allows eighteen hours of leave per
year;173 Minnesota provides sixteen hours per year;174 Rhode Island
gives ten;175 Illinois and Texas, eight hours;176 Tennessee, “one day”
per month;177 and North Carolina, four hours.178 Nevada’s school
activities leave is available for a maximum of four hours, but, like in
Hawaii, that limitation applies to each child, not as an overall
total amount.179
Some states also provide limits on the number of hours that can
be used per day or per month. In California, parents are limited to
eight hours per month.180 In Colorado, time is limited to no more than
168. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78-31 (LexisNexis 2009).
169. CAL. LAB. CODE § 230.7(a) (West 2010); Act effective Aug. 15, 2009, ch. 292, § 2,
2009 Nev. Stat. 1246, 1247.
170. CAL. LAB. CODE § 230.8(a)(1) (West 2010).
171. In Vermont, “short-term family leave,” as it is termed in the statute, can also be
used for children’s “routine medical or dental appointments,” for accompanying other
family members to “appointments for professional services related to their care and
well-being,” and for responding to medical emergencies of family members. VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 21, § 472a(a)(2)-(4) (2010). In Massachusetts, the twenty-four hours of leave can
also be used for routine medical appointments for children or elderly relatives. MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 52D(b) (West Supp. 2009).
172. D.C. CODE § 32-1202(a) (2010).
173. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-13.3-103(1) (2009). In Colorado, this leave is not required if
the employer already provides leave, such as vacation or personal leave, to the employee
that can be taken for school leave purposes. Id. § 8-13.3-103(7).
174. MINN. STAT. § 181.9412 (2009).
175. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-48-12(a) (2010).
176. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 147/15(a) (West 2008); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 661.206(b) (Vernon 2004).
177. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 49-6-7001(b)(5) (2009).
178. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.3(a) (2009).
179. Act effective Aug. 15, 2009, ch. 292, § 1, 2009 Nev. Stat. 1246, 1247; see also HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 78-31 (LexisNexis 2009) (“The employee shall take no more than two
mutually-scheduled conferences, per child, in a single academic year.”).
180. CAL. LAB. CODE § 230.8(a)(1) (West 2010).
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six hours per month, and employers may limit time to increments
of no more than three hours.181 In Illinois, time is limited to no more
than four hours per day.182 Conversely, in Vermont, an employer can
require an employee to use the leave in increments no smaller than
two hours.183 In Nevada, minimum increments are one hour.184
4. Leave Limits
The statutes limit the use of school involvement leave in two
ways. The first limit is on the employee’s ability to use school leave
independent of other types of leave. Three states require that em-
ployees use other types of leave before or along with the school in-
volvement leave. Under California’s school activities statute, vacation,
personal, or compensatory leave must be used concurrently with school
activities leave.185 In Illinois, the statute requires that employees
exhaust all other paid or unpaid leave, except for sick leave and
disability leave, before school involvement leave is available.186
Other states give discretion to the employee or employer to
make leave concurrent. For example, in Vermont, employees may
use accrued paid leave concurrently with the short-term leave.187 In
California, Rhode Island, and Washington, D.C., if the employer al-
ready provides time off without pay, the employee may use it con-
currently with or substitute it for the school involvement leave.188 In
Massachusetts, the employee can choose, or an employer can require,
substitution of accrued paid leave for the leave.189 Interestingly, in
Colorado, not only can an employee or employer elect to substitute
paid leave for unpaid school involvement leave, an employer is not
required to provide leave under the statute at all if the other types of
paid or unpaid leave it provides, such as vacation or personal leave,
are sufficient to meet the school involvement leave statute.190
Second, some statutes give the employer significant power in
limiting the leave use, particularly where the leave would be disruptive
to the employer. In Washington, D.C., an employer may deny leave
if granting it “would disrupt the employer’s business and make the
181. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-13.3-103(1)(a), (2) (2009).
182. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 147/15(a) (West 2008).
183. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 472a(a) (2010).
184. Act effective Aug. 15, 2009, ch. 292, § 1, 2009 Nev. Stat. 1246, 1247.
185. CAL. LAB. CODE § 230.8(b)(1) (West 2010) (requiring concurrent use).
186. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 147/15(a) (West 2008).
187. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 472a(c) (2010).
188. CAL. LAB. CODE § 230.8(b)(1) (West 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-48-12(c) (2010);
D.C. CODE § 32-1202(d) (2010).
189. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 52D(c) (West Supp. 2009).
190. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-13.3-103(7) (2009).
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achievement of production or service delivery unusually difficult.”191
In Illinois, employers are not required to give employees school visi-
tation leave if doing so “would result in more than [five percent] of
the employer’s work force” taking visitation leave at the same time.192
Under California’s school activities statute, an employer can pro-
hibit both of a child’s parents employed at the same worksite from
taking leave simultaneously.193 In Hawaii, the state can refuse leave
if it will “adversely interfere” with work or require additional costs.194
Tennessee makes state employees’ leave “subject to department ap-
proval or the approval of the employees’ immediate supervisor.”195
In Colorado, the limitations an employer can impose upon the
leave turn not only on the impact the leave might have on the em-
ployer’s business, but also on the reason the parent needs to attend
the school activity. First, an employer can deny leave where the em-
ployee’s absence would “result in a halt of service or production.”196
In addition, although the leave statute specifically applies to parent-
teacher conferences and other statutorily defined meetings, an em-
ployer can limit the leave to only those conferences and meetings “in
cases of emergency or other situations that may endanger a person’s
health or safety.”197
In other situations, the employer is not given the power to pro-
hibit the leave, but the burden is on the employee to avoid or attempt
to avoid disruptions. In Minnesota and Rhode Island, an employee
must make reasonable efforts not to disrupt the operations of the
employer by taking the leave.198 In Illinois, the employee is required
to “consult with the employer to schedule the leave so as not to disrupt
unduly the operations of the employer.”199 In Vermont and Colorado,
the employee is expected to make reasonable attempts to schedule
the appointments during non-work hours.200 In North Carolina’s
and Nevada’s school activities leave provisions, the time of the leave
must be mutually agreed upon by the employee and employer.201
191. D.C. CODE § 32-1202(c) (2010).
192. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 147/49 (West 2008).
193. CAL. LAB. CODE § 230.8(a)(2) (West 2009).
194. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78-31 (LexisNexis 2009) (stating leave is not available if
it will “adversely interfere with the operations of the work unit [or] require the applicable
agency to incur additional human resources or overtime costs”).
195. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-7001(b)(5) (2009).
196. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-13.3-103(c) (2009).
197. Id.
198. MINN. STAT. § 181.9412 subdiv. 2 (2009) (employee must make “reasonable effort”
to not “disrupt unduly” the employer’s business by taking leave); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-48-
12(b) (2010) (same).
199. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 147/15(a) (West 2008).
200. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 472a(b) (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-13.3-103(3) (2009).
201. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.3(a)(1) (2009); Act effective Aug. 15, 2009, ch. 292, § 1,
2009 Nev. Stat. 1246, 1247.
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Two states impose a duty upon the employer to allow employees
to make up time missed from taking school involvement leave. In
Illinois, employees are given the “right[ ]” to make up the time for
the school visitation “on a different day or shift as directed by the
employer,” 202 and employers are expected to make a “good faith
effort” to give a “reasonable opportunity” for the make up work.203
In Colorado, an employer and an employee can agree to allow the
employee to take paid leave for the “academic activity” and make up
those hours of paid leave during the same work week.204
5. Notice and Documentation Requirements
Most statutes require that employers receive some kind of
advance notice of an employee’s intent to take school involvement
leave. The most broadly worded provisions simply require advance
notice with no time frame specified. In Texas, for example, an em-
ployee is required to give “advance notice” of the intent to use the
leave.205 Other states, including California206 and Minnesota,207
provide an open-ended reasonable notice requirement.
Still other states require a specific period of advance notice
for leave, including seven days’ notice in Illinois,208 Vermont,209 and
Massachusetts;210 one week notice in Colorado,211 ten days’ notice
202. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 147/20 (West 2008).
203. Id.
204. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-13.3-103(1)(a) (2009).
205. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.§ 661.206(c) (Vernon 2004).
206. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 230.7(a), 230.8(a)(1) (West 2010) (requiring employee to give
“reasonable notice” that a school visit is required).
207. MINN. STAT. § 181.9412 subdiv. 2 (2009).
208. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 145/15(a) (West 2008). Under the statute, written
notice is required. In Cisneros v. Condell Medical Center, the plaintiff brought Title VII
discrimination, harassment, and retaliation actions along with a pendant state claim
for a violation of the School Visitation Rights Act. Cisneros, No. 01 C 3826, 2002 WL
1424557, at *3-*5 (N.D. Ill. June 28, 2002). The federal district court granted the
employer’s motion for summary judgment in part because the employee had failed to
give seven days advance notice for a visit and did not contact the school to reschedule
the meeting for a time after work. Id. at *5.
209. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 472a(b) (2010).
210. MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 52D(d) (West Supp. 2009). In Mellen v. Trustees
of Boston University, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit declined
to decide whether specific reference to the Small Necessities Act was necessary in order
to give notice. Mellen, 504 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 2007). The court, however, held that
“[d]isagreement about a return date” did not amount to a request for leave under the
act, and that statements that indicated that the Federal Family and Medical Leave Act
leave would be enough to cover the needed time off were not sufficient to put the
employer on notice of a Small Necessities Act leave request. Id. at 27-28.
211. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-13.3-103(4) (2009).
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in Washington, D.C.;212 five days’ notice via written request for
Nevada’s school activities leave;213 and twenty-four hours’ notice in
Rhode Island.214 In Illinois, the advance notice is required even be-
fore the employee makes arrangements for the attendance.215 In
North Carolina, an employer may require a written notice forty-
eight hours in advance.216
Some states have an exception to the specific notice require-
ment for an emergency or unforeseeable situation. For example, in
Washington, D.C., and Minnesota the advanced notice requirement
does not apply if the event “cannot be reasonably foreseen.” 217 In
Vermont, an employee does not have to give notice in the case of
an “emergency,” which is defined as a situation where the notice
requirement would have “significant adverse impact on [a] family
member.” 218 In Massachusetts, if the school event is “not foresee-
able,” the employee must provide “practicable” notice.219 In Illinois,
if the visit is because of an emergency, the employee needs to give
the employer no more than twenty-four hours’ advance notice.220 In
Colorado, if the activity is an “emergency,” notice must be given “as
soon as possible.” 221
In some states, employees are either statutorily required to
provide verification of the school visit or may be required to do so by
their employers, and some of the statutes are quite specific regard-
ing the kind of notice that can be required. In Illinois, employees are
required to submit verification of the school visit to the employer
that includes “the exact time and date the visitation occurred and
ended.” 222 If the employee does not submit the verification within
two working days of the visitation, the employee can be subject to the
“standard disciplinary procedures imposed by the employer for un-
excused absences.” 223 In Massachusetts, the employer can request
a “certification” from the employee for the leave224 that describes the
212. D.C. CODE § 32-1202(e) (2010).
213. Act effective Aug. 15, 2009, ch. 292, § 1, 2009 Nev. Stat. 1246, 1247.
214. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-48-12 (2010).
215. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 147/15(a) (West 2008).
216. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.3(a)(2) (2009).
217. D.C. CODE § 32-1202(e) (2010); MINN. STAT. § 181.9412 subdiv. 2 (2009).
218. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 472a(b) (2010).
219. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 52D(d) (West Supp. 2009).
220. 147/15(a).
221. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-13.3-103(4) (2009).
222. 147/30. Under the statute, the Department of Labor and the State Superintendent
are to suggest a “standard form of documentation” for school use. Id. The Illinois Depart-
ment of Labor provides a school visitation leave form on its website. See Ill. Department
of Labor, School Visitation Form, http://www.state.il.us/agency/idol/laws/LAW147.htm
(providing a link to the School Visitation Leave Form) (last visited Feb. 3, 2010).
223. 147/30.
224. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 52D(e) (West Supp. 2009).
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date, duration, and purpose of the leave.225 An employer can request
addition verification so long as it is not “unduly burdensome” and
is “reasonable.” 226
Other statutes are less specific. In Colorado, Nevada and North
Carolina, the employer may request verification of the school visit.227
For leave under the California school activities statute, the employer
may require the employee to provide documentation from the school
or child care facility as proof of attending a school-related event.228
The required documentation, however, is only what the school, and
not the employer, deems “appropriate and reasonable.” 229
6. School Obligations
A minority of the school involvement leave statutes impose
requirements upon the school as part of the leave process. Under
California’s discipline leave statute, a school’s policy for requiring
parents to come for required meetings must “take into account rea-
sonable factors that may prevent [a parent’s] compliance with a
notice to attend.” 230 Additionally, under California’s school activities
statute, schools are required to give documentation of attendance if
it is requested by the employer.231 In Colorado and Tennessee, schools
must give documentation verifying participation if it is requested
by the employee.232 Colorado also requires that schools “make their
best efforts to accommodate the schedules of employees.”233 In Illinois,
schools are required to have “regular school hours and evening hours”
available for non-emergency visits.234 Additionally, schools, not em-
ployers, are required to notify “parents or guardians” of their school
visitation rights.235
C. Sidenote: Louisiana’s “Permissive” Approach to School Leave
Louisiana has taken an unusual approach to school involvement
leave but rather permits an employer to give up to sixteen hours of
225. 940 MASS. CODE REGS. 20.02 (2010) (describing the elements of a “sufficient”
certification and supplying a form for employers to use).
226. Id. 20.04.
227. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-13.3-103(2) (2009); Act effective Aug. 15, 2009, ch. 292, § 1,
2009 Nev. Stat. 1246, 1247; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.3(a)(3) (2009).
228. CAL. LAB. CODE § 230.8(c) (West 2010).
229. Id.
230. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900.1(a) (West 2006).
231. § 230.8(c).
232. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-13.3-103(2) (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-7001(b)(5) (2009)
(referring to state employees).
233. § 8-13.3-103(3).
234. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 147/15(c) (West 2008).
235. Id. 147/25.
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unpaid leave per year to worker-parent employees “to attend, observe
or participate in conferences or classroom activities related to the
employee’s dependent children for whom he is the legal guardian
that are conducted at the child’s school or day care center.” 236 The
leave can be granted only for activities that “cannot reasonably be
scheduled” during off work hours.237 An employee must provide
“reasonable notice” to the employer prior to the leave and must make
“reasonable efforts” to not “unduly disrupt” the employer’s operations
by the leave.238 Although the leave is unpaid, the employee is entitled
to substitute any paid leave for the school conference leave.239
In 2008 legislative session, a bill that died in committee would
have amended the statute to require an employer with twenty or
more employees to provide school involvement leave.240 A bill pro-
posed in 2009 contained language permitting employers to take a
corporate income tax deduction if the employer gave employees paid
leave to attend a child’s school activities, thereby giving employers
an economic incentive to provide leave.241
236. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1015.2(A) (1998).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. § 1015.2(B).
240. H.B. 1323, 34th Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2008). The employer would also have been
required to provide written notice of the statute to employees, either in the employee
handbook or in a separate written document. Id.
241. H.B. 269, 35th Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2009). Tennessee, Oklahoma, and Oregon
have also taken or explored permissive-style approaches to the school involvement leave
problem. In 1999, the Tennessee legislature introduced a joint resolution “fervently
urg[ing] and encourag[ing]” Tennessee employers to permit employees to attend their
children’s parent-teacher conferences, without forfeiting vacation or sick leave to do so,
as long as the employee gave “twenty-four (24) hours notice.” H.J. Res. 56, 101st Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 1999). The joint resolution expressed the views or sentiments
of both houses of the legislature and was signed by the governor on May 13, 2000. See
Bill Information for HJR 0056, http://www.capitol.tn.gov/legislation/archives.html (last
visited Feb. 4, 2010) (follow “101st General Assembly” hyperlink; then follow “Bills
and Resolutions” hyperlink; then follow “HJR0001-HJR0100” hyperlink; then follow
“HJR0056” hyperlink).
Oklahoma currently requires its State Board of Education to “establish a program for
encouraging private employers to give employees who have children in preschool
programs, kindergarten, or school programs time off to visit the schools for parent-
teacher conferences at least once each semester.” OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 10-105.2(C)
(West 2010).
As part of a larger overhaul of education law, Oregon directed that its schools have
parental and community involvement policies. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 329.125 (West 2009).
In that statute, the legislature recommends that “employers be encouraged to extend
appropriate leave to parents or guardians to allow greater participation in that process
during school hours.” Id. § 329.125(3). Since 2006, the State Superintendent has developed
sample parental involvement policies that comply with federal requirements. These
policies, however, do not mention employers giving paid or unpaid leave to employees
to participate in school activities. OR. DEP’T OF EDUC., SAMPLE PARENTAL INVOLVEMENT
POLICY 1-6 (2006), available at http://www.ode.state.or.us/initiatives/familycommunity/
files/odeschdistrparinvpolicy.doc.
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III. DOMINANT APPROACHES TO PARENTAL LEAVE LEGISLATION
Two theories have emerged as the dominant approaches for
crafting legislation regulating the relationship between work and
family in the workplace.242 The antidiscrimination approach has been
based primarily on gender discrimination under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act.243 This view suggests that the failure of employers
to account for family issues in the workplace is because gendered
notions of workplace norms define the “ideal” worker from a stereo-
typically masculine and patriarchal view,244 and that workplaces con-
tinue to be organized around the “full-time face-time norm,” which
has as its “default preferences . . .[:] full-time positions, unlimited
hours, rigid work schedules, an uninterrupted worklife, and perfor-
mance of work at a central location.” 245 As a result, discrimination
against caregivers is a structural issue that requires a “norm based”
approach rather than an individual accommodation response.246 By
using a norm-based approach, the structure of the workplace can be
altered through litigation addressing that discrimination, and the
public discussions that result from that litigation can result in regula-
tory changes.247 Some regulatory changes, have, in fact, resulted from
this discourse. For example, Alaska, the District of Columbia, and a
number of municipalities have added classifications like “parenthood,”
“family responsibilities,” and “parental status” as protected classes
in their employment discrimination statutes.248 Additional similar
state legislation is pending.249
242. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 5, at 28 (noting dominant approaches to pro-
tecting caregivers in the workplace have been mandated accommodation and protection
against discrimination).
243. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006).
244. For a recent articulation of this position, see Williams & Bornstein, supra note
7, at 1320 (“Most good jobs in the United States still assume an ideal worker — a work-
place model that was designed for a workforce of male breadwinners whose wives took
care of family and household matters.”).
245. Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment
Discrimination Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 6 (2005).
246. Williams & Bornstein, supra note 7, at 1325.
247. See Williams & Segal, supra note 7, at 113 (describing the relationship between
public discourse, “discrimination language,” and regulation); see also infra notes 256-
260 and accompanying text.
248. See Stephanie Bornstein & Julie Weber, Addressing Family Responsibilities
Discrimination, 2008 SLOAN WORK & FAMILY RES. NETWORK POL’Y BRIEFING SERIES, http://
www.bc.edu/wfnetwork/pdfs/policy_makers16.pdf (discussing state legislative prohibitions
on discrimination against parents).
249. SLOAN WORK & FAMILY RESEARCH NETWORK, BOSTON COLL., 2009 LEGISLATIVE
SUMMARY SHEET: BILLS RELATED TO FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES DISCRIMINATION RECENTLY
INTRODUCED INTO STATE LEGISLATURES 1-2 (2009), http://www.bc.edu/wfnetwork/pdfs/
BillsbyTheme_FRD.pdf (describing legislation that would add classifications like “familial
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The accommodation approach asserts that the encroachment of
family life into the workplace should be handled like disability and
religious practice issues: by making accommodations for the needs
of workers who cannot otherwise fit into the workplace without indi-
vidualized adjustments to the working conditions.250 This approach
is based upon the accommodation requirement of the Americans with
Disabilities Act251 and the accommodations required for employees’
religious practices required under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.252
Under this approach, the overall structure of the workplace is not
altered by the individual accommodations made to bring in or keep
in the workplace a worker who does not conform to the ideal.
A. Antidiscrimination Approach
The antidiscrimination approach to remedying the problems of
caregivers in the workplace “define[s] work-family conflict as a struc-
tural problem” 253 and sees “the difficulties experienced by family
caregivers [as related to] documented patterns of gender bias.” 254
This approach views work-family balance as an issue of facing dis-
advantage at work because of caregiving responsibilities,255 and these
disadvantages can be remedied by (1) discrimination litigation under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act256 as well as under other statutes, and
(2) “rights talk” that can bring about workplace restructuring.257 At
minimum, a discrimination approach can redefine which party in
an employee-employer relationship owes obligations to the other.258
Further, “ ‘[r]ights talk[,]’ [which] redefines work-family conflict[ ]
status,” “family responsibilities,” and “family caregiver status” to existing employment
discrimination protections).
250. See, e.g., Kaminer, supra note 6, at 306 (describing an accommodation approach);
Smith, supra note 6, at 1445 (same).
251. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).
252. See Kaminer, supra note 6, at 356 (discussing the Americans with Disabilities
Act model); Smith, supra note 6, at 1445 (discussing the religious accommodation model).
253. Williams & Segal, supra note 7, at 116.
254. Id. at 90.
255. Id.
256. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006); see, e.g., Michelle A. Travis, Equality in
the Virtual Workplace, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 283, 332 (2003) (discussing how
Title VII litigation can be applied to gender inequalities in telecommuting plans).
257. Williams & Segal, supra note 7, at 116; see also Joan C. Williams, Beyond the
Glass Ceiling: The Maternal Wall as a Barrier to Gender Equality, 26 T. JEFFERSON
L. REV. 1, 11 (2003) (noting that antidiscrimination law functions “as a language of
social ethics”).
258. See Williams & Segal, supra note 7, at 116 (discussing the ideal worker standard
and its relationship to discrimination); see also Williams & Bornstein, supra note 7, at
1322 (noting “continued framing . . . of work/family conflict as an issue of individual
women’s ‘choices’ rather than as a larger economic or structural problem”).
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so that it is no longer seen as a personal inability to balance one’s
responsibilities but as a structural problem that requires a structural
solution,” 259 can promote institutional change.260 If the litigation
taking place in courtrooms affects how the public talks about issues,261
this antidiscrimination talk can also be “successful in the court of
public opinion” and “could help spur an effort to enact legislation to
protect the rights people have become convinced they have.”262
Joan Williams has used the antidiscrimination approach to craft
the “Family Responsibilities Discrimination” claim, which applies
a Title VII gender discrimination framework to working caregivers
who are either subject to adverse job actions based on stereotypical
views about the competencies and preferences of mothers (as well as
other caregivers), or who were treated differently from other workers
who did not have caregiving responsibility.263 Other family responsi-
bility discrimination claims based on gender stereotyping have arisen
under the FMLA and the ADA.264
Using an antidiscrimination approach for achieving workplace
equality for worker-parents or caregivers has received some criti-
cism.265 First, the antidiscrimination approach, implemented primar-
ily under Title VII, has been criticized for being unable to accomplish
its stated purpose of eliminating the workplace exclusion of care-
givers resulting from organizational structures premised on an ideal
worker or “full-time face-time” norm.266 The critique suggests that
these norms are so deeply embedded in Title VII and our common
understandings of the nature of the workplace, that judges are
259. Williams & Segal, supra note 7, at 114.
260. See id. (discussing the redefinition of “work-family conflict,” which can lead to
structural and social changes).
261. Id. at 113.
262. Id.
263. Joan C. Williams, Family Responsibilities Discrimination: The Next Generation
of Employment Discrimination Cases, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, 36TH ANNUAL
INSTITUTE ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 333, 335 (2007); Williams & Bornstein, supra note 7,
at 1313 (“FRD is discrimination against employees based on their responsibilities to
care for family members.”). For a guide to Family Responsibilities Discrimination, see
Joan C. Williams & Cynthia Thomas Calvert, WORKLIFE LAW’S GUIDE TO FAMILY
RESPONSIBILITIES DISCRIMINATION (2006) (providing a thorough exploration of the subject).
264. Williams & Bornstein, supra note 7, at 1345.
265. See Travis, supra note 256, at 319 (noting that antidiscrimination approaches
cannot completely solve the problem of caregiver exclusion); Travis, supra note 245, at
7, n.15 (compiling commentators’ critiques of the discrimination approach).
266. Travis, supra note 245, at 6 (noting that “Title VII has [not] done much to trans-
form this exclusionary norm”); see Smith, supra note 6, at 1456 (asserting that antidis-
crimination law does not effectively address structures that devalue worker-parents).
But see Williams & Bornstein, supra note 7, at 1331-35 (arguing that antidiscrimination
litigation is the only way to impact the workplace structures and eliminate the ideal
worker norm).
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limited in their ability to view Title VII cases in a way that chal-
lenges that norm.267
Second, the approach has been critiqued for focusing on the dis-
criminatory intent of the individual actor under the Civil Rights Act
and for not addressing the more subtle and unconscious bias perme-
ating the organizational structure that perpetuates discrimination
in everyday decisions, perceptions, and judgments in the workplace.268
To address this problem, an approach has been advocated that would
hold the organization itself responsible, not just the actors within it,
for failing to change the context that perpetuates bias and stereotypes
in decision-making processes of the workplace.269 According to this
critique, antidiscrimination, as currently defined, is not equipped
to deal with “the more subtle forms of discrimination that . . . limit
opportunity on a day-to-day basis in the modern workplace . . . .”270
Other limitations on the effectiveness of the antidiscrimination
approach in addressing caregiver needs in the workplace have been
identified.271 First, successful claims of unintentional discrimination,
such as where job requirements have been based on the ideal worker
standard, have been more rare because courts have been generous
in finding that legitimate business reasons justify a practice that
otherwise has a disparate impact.272 Second, others argue that the
antidiscrimination approach, as currently defined in Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, will not reach situations where men, as caregivers,
have been discriminated against, because the claim has been based
on discrimination against women.273
267. See Travis, supra note 245, at 6-7 (describing how judges essentialize the work-
place according to the “full-time face-time” norm in Title VII and ADA claims); see also
Dowd, supra note 4, at 80 (discussing that an antidiscrimination approach focused on
gender under Title VII limits the ability to view work-family issues as issues of race or
class, for example).
268. Tristin K. Green, A Structural Approach as Antidiscrimination Mandate: Locating
Employer Wrong, 60 VAND. L. REV. 849, 857-58, 896 (2007) (noting current dominance
of an “individualized, motivational approach” to the antidiscrimination model and the
shortcomings of disparate impact theory as currently construed).
269. Id. at 889-90.
270. Id. at 862.
271. Arnow-Richman, supra note 5, at 36-45.
272. Id. at 38 (noting the “law permits employers to avoid liability for exclusionary
effects where a challenged job practice is supported by a legitimate business decision”).
But see Williams & Bornstein, supra note 7, at 1353-57 (discussing cases and new EEOC
guidance that recognizes the implicit or unconscious bias underlying stereotyping and
placing unconscious discrimination within the purview of FRD claims).
273. Arnow-Richman, supra note 5, at 38 (“An expansive reading of disparate-impact
laws is premised on the notion that women, as the primary caregivers in most families,
are disproportionately harmed relative to men by traditional work structures. As long
as this gendered division of labor persists, men will not be able to take advantage of the
theory because they will not be able to show the requisite disparate impact on the basis
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Still others who have been critical of the discrimination approach
and its efforts to create a protected class based on parenting status
argue that a formal equality approach based on a gender discrimi-
nation model to address the needs of worker-parents falls short be-
cause it “remains wedded to a limited conception of equality.” 274
Because parenthood is associated with neither the stigma nor pre-
sumption of inferiority that have accompanied race and gender, pro-
hibiting employment discrimination based on parenthood does not
fit well within Title VII’s prohibitions.275 Accordingly, this critique
asserts that the legislatively mandated accommodation of parental
duties, such as that found in the FMLA, is a better way to address
discrimination against parents in the workplace.276
B. Accommodation Approach
Scholars applying the accommodation approach to work-family
issues have turned to the Americans with Disabilities Act and to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act’s religious accommodation requirement
as the basis for arguing that “employer[s] must reasonably accom-
modate” employees’ work-family balance needs.277 Specifically, those
advocating an accommodation approach assert that “employers should
have a duty to accommodate parental obligations that conflict with
work obligations when employers can achieve the accommodation
without incurring an undue hardship.” 278
of sex.”); see Kaminer, supra note 6, at 307-08 (noting the “formal equality” limitations
of Title VII and its failure to expressly cover parents and children); Travis, supra note
256, at 320 (noting the limits of “fit[ting] work/family conflicts into a sex discrimination
box”). But see Williams & Bornstein, supra note 7, at 1320-21 (describing how implicit
gender bias and gender stereotyping of caregivers affects men and as well as women and
noting that men are successful with FRD claims).
274. Smith, supra note 71, at 572.
275. Id. at 606, 616.
276. Id. at 613-18. At the state statute level, express prohibitions against discrimination
on the basis of parenting responsibilities avoid the gender discrimination problem. Id. at
585-86 (describing states that protect workers from discrimination based on “parenthood,”
“familial status,” and “family responsibilities”). Additionally, legislation pending in a
number of states would expressly protect worker-parents from discrimination in the work-
place based upon “family caregiver status,” “familial status,” or “family responsibilities.”
See SLOAN WORK & FAMILY RESEARCH NETWORK, supra note 249, at 1-2 (listing legis-
lation pending in California, Florida, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and Maine);
Williams & Bornstein, supra note 7, at 1346 (noting that “Alaska, the District of Columbia,
and over three dozen local governments” have legislatively protected worker-parents from
discrimination based on parenting or family status); see also Arnow-Richman, supra
note 5, at 36-38 (describing critiques of discrimination approach); Dowd, supra note 4,
at 135-54 (same).
277. Kaminer, supra note 6, at 308 (arguing for a Title VII religious accommodation
model); see Kessler, supra note 6, at 457-59 (mentioning the ADA as a model); Smith,
supra note 6, at 1445 (arguing for a Title VII religious accommodation model).
278. Smith, supra note 6, at 1446 (citations omitted).
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Under this approach, employers have an affirmative duty to
employees to act to “accommodate” parents’ need to attend to family
issues.279 For an employee to make a claim under the accommoda-
tion approach, the employee must “show that he or she: (1) face[d]
a compelling parental obligation that conflicts with an employment
requirement; (2) ha[d] informed the employer about the conflict if pos-
sible [i.e., had foreseeability of the event]; and (3) was discharged or
disciplined for failing” to work when assigned.280 The burden would
then shift to the employer to show that he made a good faith effort
to accommodate or that making the accommodation would have re-
sulted in an undue hardship.281 Under the accommodation approach
advocated by Peggie Smith, an undue hardship would not arise if
the employer had to bear no “more than a moderate cost” to accom-
modate the need; that is, the cost to be borne would fall somewhere
between a “de minimis” cost requirement and the ADA’s significant
cost standard.282
The FMLA is an example of an accommodation-based regulation
applied to caregivers in the workplace. Although the FMLA describes
itself as a statute designed to address gender discrimination,283 ulti-
mately it accommodates both men and women by relieving them from
normal workplace demands for up to twelve weeks upon the birth
or adoption of a child or the “serious health condition” of the em-
ployee or a family member, while ensuring that the employee does
not suffer adverse employment action as a result.284
Critics fault the accommodation approach for failing to redefine
workplace norms while continuing to place caregiving outside the
ideal worker norm.285 Specifically, the critique argues that an accom-
modation standard fails to take into account the social and biological
norms of men and women as part of the workplace.286 Additionally,
others have asserted that an accommodation approach to work-family
issues encourages employers to see the problem of work-family bal-
ance as an individual problem rather than a corporate one, which
leads to defining the work-family issues as a parent problem rather
279. Id. at 1465-66.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 1466.
282. Id. at 1480.
283. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(4)-(5) (2006) (noting
the goal of minimizing discrimination on the basis of sex).
284. Id. § 2612(a)(1) (providing basis for leave); § 2614 (describing protections);
§ 2615(a)(2) (prohibiting discrimination).
285. See, e.g., Williams & Bornstein, supra note 7, at 1323-24 (critiquing the approach);
see also Cahn, supra note 1, at 193 (noting that “accommodation of . . . parenthood often
leads to perceptions that [parents] are not ‘real’ workers”).
286. Williams & Bornstein, supra note 7, at 1323-24.
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than a workplace one, delaying large-scale structural changes.287 Addi-
tional reasons given for the ineffectiveness of the accommodation
approach include: the courts’ narrow interpretations of “reasonable”
accommodation, the difficulties administering vague accommoda-
tion policies, the redistributive nature of accommodations, and the
decline of employer-provided benefits and lack of justification for addi-
tional benefits in the current employment culture.288 Accommodation
as a term to describe the rationale for caregiving leave also falls short
on a rhetorical level. The use of the term in the work-family policy
context invokes conflicting meanings and thus limits the vision for
what might be possible for the future of work-family regulation.289
C. School Involvement Leave Statutes
The school involvement leave statutes are vulnerable to some of
the existing antidiscrimination and accommodation approach cri-
tiques. First, the specific definitions required to avoid the vagueness
problems associated with accommodation290 result in definitions that
attempt to achieve uniformity but are more successful at distorting.291
That is, the statutes attempt to standardize the meaning of parents,
children, and school activities, but this results in a wide definitional
range that ultimately provides no standardization whatsoever. In
other words, attempts at definition distort who can or should be cov-
ered and what activities are relevant under the statutes. For example,
under the statutes, “child” is both explicitly and implicitly defined
to mean any, some, or all of the following: a biological child; a step-
child; a preschool-age child; a child in a licensed day-care facility; a
homeschooled child; an individual under twenty years of age if still
in secondary school; a grandchild; a niece or a nephew; and anyone
who has a “guardian,” legal or otherwise.292 None of the statutes in-
corporate all of these definitions, however, which reveals how the
attempts to define the categories of individuals to be accommodated
are distorted by definition. And, not only is it problematic to distort
the category of who should be able to take advantage of the statute,
but these shifting definitions create compliance problems for em-
ployers attempting to define who counts as parents under the statutes.
287. Gonyea & Googins, supra note 2, at 69.
288. Arnow-Richman, supra note 5, at 43-44.
289. Davis, supra note 18, at 545-50 (describing the limits of meaning for the term
“accommodation” in work-family policy).
290. Arnow-Richman, supra note 5, at 43-44.
291. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 38 (2d ed. 1994) (noting the idea of “[d]istortion
as the price of uniformity”).
292. See supra Part II.B.2.
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Second, the reasons an employer can assert to avoid giving
school involvement leave demonstrate that what is a reasonable
accommodation for school involvement leave is construed relatively
narrowly. Stated another way, the legitimate business reasons or
undue hardships that justify refusing to give school involvement leave
are generally expressed quite broadly. For example, Hawaii allows
an employer to deny leave if it will “adversely interfere” with work;293
in Washington, D.C., employers can deny leave if the leave would
cause productivity to be “unusually difficult.” 294 In Colorado, em-
ployers can limit the otherwise statutorily guaranteed leave “in cases
of emergency” and preclude leave if it would “halt . . . production;”295
in Illinois, leave cannot “disrupt unduly” the employer’s operations,
and an employer can deny leave if more than five percent of its work-
force would be absent for a school visit.296 In Minnesota and Rhode
Island, employees must make “a reasonable effort” 297 not to disrupt
the employer’s operations. In Colorado and Vermont, employees must
make “reasonable attempt[s]” to schedule the school activities during
non-work hours.298
These examples show that school involvement leave statutes
limit worker-parents’ opportunities to take leave provided for under
the statute using expansive terms to describe when the statutorily
authorized leave is not permitted. In addition, these limits do little
to articulate the hidden assumptions that can underlie decision-
making about when an employer suffers an undue disruption or
undue burden by an employee’s absence or what it means to make
a “reasonable effort.” 
Third, the allocation of control between employer and employee
expressed in some of the statutes perpetuates the notion that care-
giving remains outside workplace norms and is still an individual
problem rather than in institutional one. For example, some statutes
permit an employer to require worker-parents to provide detailed
documentation of leave after it is taken299 while at the same time
293. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78-31 (LexisNexis 2009).
294. D.C. CODE § 32-1202(c) (2010).
295. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-13.3-103(1)(c) (2009).
296. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 147/15, 147/49 (West 2008).
297. MINN. STAT. § 181.9412 subdiv. 2 (2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-48-12(b) (2010).
298. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-13.3-103 (2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §472a(b) (2010).
299. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 230.8(c) (West 2010) (employers can request “docu-
mentation from the school”); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 147/30 (West 2008) (employees
must submit “exact time and date” of the visitation within two working days or be subject
“to the standard disciplinary procedures imposed by the employer for unexcused absences
from work”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 52D(e) (West Supp. 2009) (requiring suf-
ficient certification); 940 MASS. CODE REGS. 20.02 (2009) (describing sufficient certification
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permitting employers to refuse leave when it exceeds a statutorily
defined “hardship” level for the employer.300 In other words, control
of the leave process remains in the hands of the employer, and the
employee has minimal control over the process; the employee can
request, but not demand, leave subject to the business needs of the
employer. This structure reinforces institutional norms regarding
the abnormality of caregivers in the workplace as well as norms about
the trustworthiness of employees taking workplace leave.301
Moreover, the structure of the statutes create a paradox of con-
trol and responsibility. Although employers are often in the position
of controlling the terms of employee leave-taking by having an “undue
burden” or “disruption” trump, they are positioned to be responsible,
in most of the statutes, to provide the leave requested or face allega-
tions of discriminatory conduct. In other words, the responsibility for
providing conditions that permit leave-taking rest with the employer
even though they can also exercise discretion to limit the leave autho-
rized by the express terms of the statute. Similarly, worker-parents
face a paradox of control and responsibility; they are responsible for
coordinating their educational involvement with the demands of their
work, but, in many cases, they can exercise little control over the con-
ditions of that coordination, particularly where the employer makes
the ultimate determination about disruption or undue burdens.
Finally, the accommodation and antidiscrimination approaches
to craft school involvement leave statutes limit the ways in which
possibilities for managing work and family can be discussed. For
example, if school involvement leave is characterized as a matter of
discrimination, then discussions may be shoe-horned into an analysis
of what kinds of conduct in this context are discriminatory, and the
discourse may gravitate toward parental rights. And while “rights”
can be a positive frame for thinking about work-family management,
characterizing the question of school involvement leave as a worker-
parent’s right does not go far to solve the questions of how parents
can become more involved in their child’s school activities while still
meeting their employment obligations and how employers can facili-
tate that involvement. Conversely, if the issue is characterized as one
of “accommodation,” then the discussion takes on a tenor of obligation
as one providing the date, duration, and purpose of leave along with the employee’s
signature, and suggesting the form the certification should take).
300. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 32-1202(c) (2010) (allowing employer to deny leave if it will
make work “unusually difficult”).
301. Arnow-Richman, supra note 5, at 30-31 (noting that the law reinforces structural
exclusion and social biases); see also Davis, supra note 18, at 543 (noting that employers
contend that employees take leave improperly under the FMLA).
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and benefit, a tenor that suggests that because the accommodation
is a benefit to the employee and a cost to the employer, the employer
should strictly control when and how the accommodation is used.302
In sum, viewing the question of worker-parents’ involvement in
their children’s school activities as a matter of accommodating less-
than-ideal-worker obligations or avoiding discrimination against
parents in the workplace limits the range of possible strategies and
identities worker-parents can use in reconciling work-family obli-
gations. An alternative approach to work-family regulation, which
comes from combining concepts found in identity theory and in orga-
nizational communication work-family research, is offered below as
an alternative frame for crafting school involvement leave policies
that can avoid some of the problems associated with the accommo-
dation and antidiscrimination approaches. An empowerment identity
approach would enable the statutes to reflect multiple and conflicting
worker-parent identities through definitional openness. It would
enable worker-parents to coordinate control and responsibility for
work-family obligations, and it would assist worker-parents in inte-
grating their parental and workplace identities by creating discursive
resources that recognize family obligations as part of work identity.
IV. AN EMPOWERMENT IDENTITY BASED ALTERNATIVE: USING
ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION THEORY TO CRITIQUE AND
CRAFT SCHOOL INVOLVEMENT LEAVE LEGISLATION
An empowerment identity approach to work-family regulation
synthesizes organizational communication identity studies and work-
family discourse studies that place research and practice in an em-
powerment framework.303 This approach looks at school involvement
leave legislation as a discursive resource for empowering worker-
parents to construct authentic identities and to create individualized
solutions to tensions arising at the intersection of work and family.
Although an admittedly nontraditional approach for crafting and
critiquing parental leave legislation, much of the value of the approach
lies in its novelty in interrogating and observing the law; it privileges
a view of law as a language for identifying and talking about family
and work relationships and offers an alternative normative approach
for problematizing and regulating those relationships. This approach
302. See Arnow-Richman, supra note 5, at 43-44 (noting the critique of accommo-
dation as redistributive); Davis, supra note 18, at 548-49 (noting employers have “been
described as bearing all of the burdens for making accommodation”); Williams & Segal,
supra note 7, at 80 (noting the view that accommodation is costly).
303. Kirby et al., supra note 16, at 4-5.
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does not determinatively reject the accommodation and antidiscrimi-
nation approaches; to do so would be to invoke the kind of closure
that deters productive synergy in work-family law. Rather, it articu-
lates a vision for what might be legislatively possible by focusing on
communication, empowerment, and identity development as frame-
works for understanding rather than on accommodation and anti-
discrimination claims.304
Part A reviews identity theory developed in the organizational
communication context,305 a theory that seeks to explain how individ-
uals are positioned by and “position themselves in the world through
language and action,” 306 and then links identity theory to the regu-
lation of the relationship between work and family. Part B discusses
the work of organizational communication scholars who critique the
prevailing frames for understanding the relationship between work
and family and describes the empowerment approach, which seeks
to address the shortcomings of those frames. Finally, Part C com-
bines identity theory with the empowerment approach to create an
empowerment identity approach for thinking about work-family
regulation at the legislative level, describes how this approach shares
characteristics with other recently proposed approaches to work-family
regulation, and shows how an empowerment identity approach can
provide an alternative and useful way to view school involvement
leave legislation.
A. Identity Theory and Its Relevance to Work-Family Issues in the
Employment Setting
Identity can best be described as one’s notion of self within a
particular context, produced by “competing, fragmentary, and
304. This author joins other scholars in noting that the problems of the modern
workplace are “multifaceted” and require multifaceted solutions. See, e.g., Travis, supra
note 245, at 7-8 (describing recognition that no one solution can solve the problem of
workplace equality).
305. The organizational communication context is particularly relevant to identity
in the work-family context since organizational discourses play a significant role in
developing one’s workplace identity. See infra Part IV.A.
306. ERIC M. EISENBERG ET AL., ORGANIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION: BALANCING
CREATIVITY AND CONSTRAINT 199 (5th ed. 2007); Kirby et al., supra note 16, at 13 (describ-
ing identity as a negotiation and a process through which individuals assume, understand,
and interpret their roles at work and in the home); Craig R. Scott et al., Development of
a Structurational Model of Identification in the Organization, 8 COMM. THEORY 298, 303-04
(1998) (describing identity as “a type of knowledge about a part of our self that helps to
produce and to reproduce behaviors in specific social situations . . . [that] is shaped by
and revealed through discourse”); Sarah J. Tracy & Angela Trethewey, Fracturing the
Real-SelfFake-Self Dichotomy: Moving Toward “Crystallized” Organizational Discourses
and Identities, 15 COMM. THEORY 168, 170 (2005) (identity is a notion of “self whose
meaning emerges out of reflexive social interactions with others”).
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contradictory discourses.” 307 It is made up of “core beliefs or assump-
tions, values, attitudes, preferences, decisional premises, gestures,
habits, rules, and so on.” 308 Identity is perhaps better thought of as
“identities” — multiple rather than singular.309 Because they are con-
textual, individuals are capable of holding multiple, yet integrated,
identities.310 In some contexts, certain identities emerge as primary
or preferred, while others become secondary or marginal.311 In other
contexts, the identities may occupy a different place in the hierarchy.312
And when faced with conflict, individuals will “choose among valued
identities” in order to alleviate the conflict.313
More important to this project is how individuals socially con-
struct identity through language. One’s notion of self, or one’s iden-
tity, is the product of communication processes314 with others within
discursive structures. Thought of slightly differently, in order to
create a self, individuals engage in the process of identification, draw-
ing upon available institutional and language resources that can be
reproduced as their own identity.315 In the modern economy, some
scholars posit that identification is a greater motivator for individuals
in organizations than money.316
In contemporary society, organizations such as workplaces have
become important locations for identity development317 because as
307. Tracy & Trethewey, supra note 306, at 168.
308. Scott et al., supra note 306, at 303.
309. Organization identity theorists have been leaning against the concept of a mono-
lithic identity or the idea of real and fake selves and have proposed the idea that indi-
viduals have multiple identities. See, e.g., Tracy & Trethewey, supra note 306, at 186
(describing a “crystallized” identity as “neither real nor fake,” but “multidimensional[,] . . .
[having] different shapes depending on the various discourses through which they are
constructed and constrained,” and “stronger, more beautiful, and more productive” than
a single-faceted self).
310. Kuhn & Nelson, supra note 14, at 8 (noting the existence of multiple identities).
311. For one take on the concept of “preferred identity” see Tracy & Trethewey, supra
note 306, at 178-84 (noting three processes employers use to create a “preferred organi-
zational identity”).
312. See Kuhn & Nelson, supra note 14, at 11 (describing how identities may be dis-
tributed “across several structures” or adjusted in response to conflict).
313. Id.
314. See Scott et al., supra note 306, at 305 (discussing identification as 
language-based).
315. See Kuhn & Nelson, supra note 14, at 11 (noting that participation in “social
contexts and events [can] activate particular identities”).
316. George Cheney, The Rhetoric of Identification and the Study of Organizational
Communication, 69 Q.J. SPEECH 143, 157 (1983) (citing the work of John Kenneth
Galbraith, who “explains that identification has succeeded pecuniary motivation (and
compulsion before that) as the most important motivating force in the
modern corporation”).
317. Tracy & Trethewey, supra note 306, at 169 (noting that the workplace is
an organizational site where the self is socially constructed and that “[s]cholarship
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more individuals enter the workplace and spend time there, workplace
resources become readily available to be drawn upon for identifica-
tion.318 Within organizations, articulated norms, policies, and prac-
tices, along with social interactions with others, provide “discursive
resources” or institutional scripts319 for creating particular identities.
Discursive resources within organizations are “socially constructed
frame[s] drawn from a culture or subculture [within an organization]
that enable members to assign meaning to . . . activity,” 320 inviting
those organizational “members to enact particular identities.” 321
Relatedly, “scripts” have been defined as “knowledge structure[s]
that fit[ ] predictable, conventional, or frequently encountered situ-
ations[,] . . . schemas for understanding events or behaviors.” 322
Importantly, identity is located not only in the memory and knowl-
edge of workers but also in institutionalized places such as “rules,
rituals, [and] handbooks.” 323
With respect to work-family relationships specifically, research
on identity development related to the workplace reveals that iden-
tity is an “ongoing accomplishment[ ] that [is] continually informed
and constructed by discourses of gender, power, and organization.” 324
These discourses are located, in part, within the workplace. Work-
places offer resources for constructing identity that are generally con-
sistent with the public/private divide between work and family and
with a masculine norm of what it means to be an employee.325 The
dominant organizational logic offers employees an identity consis-
tent with the ideal worker standard: an employee should be a “male
worker whose life centers on his full-time, life-long job, while his wife
or another woman takes care of his personal needs and his chil-
dren,” 326 or the employee should act like that male worker. Moreover,
increasingly indicates that individuals form their identities based on organizational and
workgroups [sic] as much or more than on home lives”).
318. These readily available resources are known as “proximate structures.” Kuhn
& Nelson, supra note 14, at 31.
319. Dennis A. Gioia & Peter P. Poole, Scripts in Organizational Behavior, 9 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 449, 449, 458 (1984).
320. Kuhn & Nelson, supra note 14, at 12.
321. Tracy & Trethewey, supra note 306, at 172.
322. Gioia & Poole, supra note 319, at 450.
323. Scott et al., supra note 306, at 304.
324. EISENBERG ET AL., supra note 306, at 203; see also KAREN LEE ASHCRAFT &
DENNIS K. MUMBY, REWORKING GENDER: A FEMINIST COMMUNICOLOGY OF ORGANIZATION
72 (2004) (stating that “power is produced . . . through the everyday discursive practices
that construct team members’ identities”).
325. See WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 19-37 (discussing the public/private divide and
masculine norms with respect to the ideal employee).
326. Joan Acker, Hierarchies, Jobs, Bodies: A Theory of Gendered Organizations, 4
GENDER & SOC’Y 139, 149 (1990).
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a worker’s private relationships of dependency should not be visible
in the workplace to resolve that conflict.327
But simply because workplaces typically foster one form of iden-
tity does not mean that workers are incapable of maintaining multiple
and equally important identities.328 They do maintain such identities,
and when those identities are in conflict, workers will often draw
upon the most readily accessible discursive resources and scripts to
resolve them.329 Thus, when work identity conflicts with family iden-
tity, workers can choose to identify with those structures and resources
for identification that are available to them in the workplace.330 Yet
communication scholars note that identity is negotiated and renego-
tiated anew based on the resources available for that negotiation.331
This means that to the extent that discursive resources or scripts at
workplaces change, identity, for both employers and employees, can
be renegotiated to incorporate those changes and to reinterpret events
and behaviors in a way that is consistent with those new scripts.332
Communication theorists exploring identity have been critical
of accommodation as an approach to work-family balance issues. First,
they critique the accommodation approach for overlooking how the
structures of discourse shape individual identities and what kinds
of identities are shaped by the discourse.333 Second, they criticize an
accommodation approach as privileging outcomes over meaning-
making. That is, they critique the accommodation approach because
it “emphasize[s] what individuals do rather than how their interpre-
tation of what they do constructs personal and social identity.” 334
For example, researchers note that work-family research in the 1990s
focused “on changing the workplace to accommodate employees with
families through programs such as dependent care, alternative work-
places, and flexible scheduling. “[Yet, with an] analytical framework
327. See Eichner, supra note 52, at 156-58 (describing the public/private divide between
autonomy and dependency).
328. In fact, researchers suggest that role accumulation, that is, seeing many roles
as important, will result in greater self-esteem, satisfaction, and less role strain. Donald
C. Reitzes & Elizabeth J. Mutran, Self-Concept as the Organization of Roles: Importance,
Centrality, and Balance, 43 SOC. Q. 647, 654, 665 (2002).
329. See Kuhn & Nelson, supra note 14, at 31 (identifying the idea of
proximate resources).
330. Id. (noting that individuals were more likely to identify with their work groups
after a work conflict because “people often look to the most proximate structures for
strong identifications”).
331. Tracy & Trethewey, supra note 306, at 169.
332. See, e.g., Kuhn & Nelson, supra note 14, at 11-14 (discussing negotiation of iden-
tification and organizational conflicts).
333. See Kirby et al., supra note 16, at 15-16 (suggesting that a discourse approach
is preferable because it does not overlook these things).
334. Id.
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in which workplace accommodations are identified as the key to suc-
cessful management of work and family, [there is a] risk of privileg-
ing structure over meaning and agency.” 335
The accommodation approach has also been criticized for over-
looking the modern conditions of identity management and social
heterogeneity.336 The problem with taking an accommodation approach
to work-family issues is that accommodation implies that “time man-
agement is the central issue.” 337 Rather, the real opportunity for
change exists where work-family “management [is characterized] as
an identity issue rather than [as] a merely logistical issue” and not
as a matter of time constraints, managing conflicts, or even altering
structures.338 Thus, even if accommodation is a necessary compo-
nent for achieving satisfaction in work-family arrangements because
accommodations can address logistical problems and time constraints,
accommodation alone will not be sufficient to solve the problem.339
Rather, by characterizing work-family issues as questions of discourse,
it is “not possible for workplace accommodations to provide a definitive
solution” to the tensions between work and family.340 “[T]he successful
management of work and family is as much an identity issue as it is
a time management issue.” 341
B. The Discursive View of Work-Family Issues: Evaluating the
Relationship between Work and Family through an
Empowerment Frame
Organizational communication scholars who focus their research
on communication and work-family issues take a discourse centered
approach to their analysis and focus on the “central role of discourse
in shaping personal identities and in maintaining and transform-
ing institutional structures.” 342 They conclude that the emphasis in
work and family research has been too focused on “outcomes rather
335. Id. at 15.
336. Annis G. Golden, Modernity and the Communicative Management of Multiple
Roles: The Case of the Worker-Parent, 1 J. FAM. COMM. 233, 236 (2001).
337. Id.
338. Kirby et al., supra note 16, at 16.
339. Golden, supra note 336, at 236.
340. Kirby et al., supra note 16, at 16.
341. Golden, supra note 336, at 236.
342. Kirby et al., supra note 16, at 3. This approach to identity is informed by struc-
turation theory, which asserts that “individual communication and action is constitutive
in producing and reproducing systems and structures. . . . At the same time, structures
influence how individuals experience and communicate about [work-family issues].”
Erika L. Kirby et al., Work/Life Conflict, in THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF CONFLICT
COMMUNICATION: INTEGRATING THEORY, RESEARCH, & PRACTICE 327, 328 (John G. Oetzel
& Stella Ting-Toomey eds., 2006).
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than . . . [on] the process of constructing those outcomes.” 343 Accord-
ingly, they suggest a purposeful shift to a focus on discursive pro-
cesses that empower individuals to manage the work-family rela-
tionship as a process rather than as a static condition or outcome.344
Work-family studies have primarily focused on the problems of
compartmentalizing life into competing spheres345 or balancing or
managing competing or segmented roles.346 These characterizations
“perpetuate an ideology of separate worlds, which holds that work
and home are bounded in space and time, carrying out autonomous
functions according to distinctive rhythms.” 347 In addition, a view
of balancing multiple, separate, and conflicting roles is privileged
over the view that an individual can construct an integrated self-
identity.348 These notions of separate boundaries and separate roles
lead to policies and practices that focus on what is appropriate and
inappropriate in the workplace349 and perpetuate the notion of “face
time,” where the employee’s commitment or loyalty to the workplace
is evidenced by the amount of time he or she spends at work.350 Be-
cause work and family are treated as separate spheres, conceptual-
izing the issue of work and family compels individuals to “minimize
or disguise their family commitments” at work.351 Conceptualizing
the relationship between work and family as a boundary or role issue
creates a question of permeability: how work and family spill over
from one domain to the other.352
Moreover, the common view of the relationship between work and
family is based on “expert rationalities” 353 dominated by a particular
343. Kirby et al., supra note 16, at 2.
344. Id. at 2-3; see also Kirby et al., supra note 342, at 342 (“[W]ork/life research
should move from roles, conflicts, and outcomes to more subtle processes of identity
construction.”); Golden, supra note 336, at 236 (noting inadequacy of concepts in work-
family research and noting that they do not give needed attention to “the identity aspect
of managing work and family”).
345. Kirby et al., supra note 16, at 5.
346. Id. at 11.
347. Id. at 6; see also Kirby et al., supra note 342, at 329 (describing models of the
relationship between work and life based on the view that one interferes with the other
and creates strain).
348. Kirby et al., supra note 16, at 11-12.
349. Id. at 9.
350. Id. at 6.; see also Kirby et al., supra note 342, at 338 (noting that “U.S. Protestant
work ethic and related notions of meritocracy create the potential for ‘face time’ to be
expected: . . . people need to be seen working hard in order for supervisors to know they
merit rewards”).
351. Kirby et al., supra note 16, at 6; see also Kirby et al., supra note 342, at 332
(describing situations where employees “are uncomfortable with talking about personal
needs with their supervisors, and so ‘managers often assume that their employees have
no childcare or eldercare problems’ ” (citations omitted)).
352. Kirby et al., supra note 16, at 7, 11.
353. Id. at 17.
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set of voices.354 An expert rationality favors predictability and con-
trol over the ways work-family issues are addressed and looks for
acontextual and generalizable solutions to work-family management
problems.355 Applying an expert rationality to work-family issues
often results in formulaic responses for dealing with work-family
conflict that are presumed to be usefully transferrable to a number
of individualized situations.356 So, from the expert perspective, get-
ting the right formula is important; energy is expended to choose a
policy that can be generalized to multiple situations, and once the
formula is in place, all issues are deemed resolved, regardless of the
individual results.357 This expert conceptualization of the work-family
relationship results in public policy proposals, such as parental leave
statutes, which focus on “time constraints . . . [and] when behaviors
acceptable in one area are seen as unacceptable in [another].” 358
Although expert rationalities can be useful for developing general
policies, they cannot address the individualized discussions of work
and family at the relational and organizational levels.359 In short,
expert rationalities mask what individuals can learn in their daily
lives, in their “practical rationalities” that emerge from daily “expe-
rience and discussion with others.” 360
Communication researchers conclude that three voices dominate
the discussion of work and family: the managerial voice; the tradi-
tional family voice; and the “upper- or middle-class, White, profes-
sional woman” voice.361 The managerial voice uses the “language of
financial contribution” to justify work-family policies.362 The focus is
on how the work-family policies impact worker productivity, how to
control costs, how to retain employees, and how to stop absenteeism
or tardiness.363 Social good or “organizations as community actors”
354. Id. at 24. Yamada discusses the Taylorizing of the American workplace, which
used time and motion studies to “determine what levels of productivity could be expected
of factory workers” and to “rationalize assembly lines and piecework payment.” Yamada,
supra note 31, at 528.
355. Kirby et al., supra note 16, at 17-18. Golden equates “modernity” with the “rise
of expert authorities.” Golden, supra note 336, at 235.
356. Kirby et al., supra note 16, at 17.
357. See id. at 18-19 (describing “technical/expert rationality” as it applies to work-
family research).
358. Id. at 18.
359. Id. at 19.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 24; see also Kirby et al., supra note 342, at 339 (noting the critique that
work/life scholars have been overly focused on certain groups of people, such as “white,
middle class women” and have ignored the experiences of others). Yamada notes that
in the “at-will” context, the extent to which an employee voice is heard is minimal and
limited to “mak[ing] requests of, or submit[ting] non-binding suggestions to, an employer.”
Yamada, supra note 31, at 534.
362. Kirby et al., supra note 16, at 25.
363. Id.
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are not brought into the discussion.364 Moreover, although “house-
holds that consist of two biological parents and children represent
less than a quarter of American families today,”365 the dominant voice
emphasizes the traditional family.
To address the shortcomings associated with the boundary, role,
rationality, and voice problematics366 typically used to frame work-
family relationships, organizational communication scholars studying
work-family issues suggest reorienting both the research and practice
of work and family by using an empowerment approach.367 An em-
powerment view is a process-oriented approach to work-family issues,
focusing on “discourse as a means to empowerment in negotiating
work-family relationships.” 368 Empowerment is “the symbolic con-
struction of one’s personal state as characterized by competence, or
the skill and ability to act effectively, and control, or the opportunity
and authority to act.” 369 Accordingly, the focus in work-family re-
search should be on uncovering how one develops a perception “of the
ability to exert social influence through communication behavior.” 370
Empowered employees are those who have “widely distributed power,
open communication, integrative problem solving, participative de-
cision making, an environment of trust, and encouragement of high
performance and self-responsibility.” 371 In sum, an empowerment
orientation emphasizes the process of developing an individual iden-
tity, creating meaning, and having agency.
An empowerment view of work-family issues reframes the tra-
ditional approaches to work and family. First, instead of viewing a
boundary as a static, compartmentalizing, and literal physical barrier,
the boundary between work and family can be framed as a “continuous
process of symbolic management . . . [where w]ork and family are
neither specific places nor groups of people, but social contexts . . . .”372
With respect to roles, the empowerment perspective pays attention
to “processes through which individuals assume role identities . . . .
includ[ing] appropriating from a diverse common stock of culturally
available role-identity definitions and interpersonal negotiations
with role partners in the workplace and the homespace.” 373 Thus,
364. Id.
365. Id. at 26. Kirby and others note that simply using the term “work-family” creates
a danger of a “heterosexist discourse.” Kirby, et al., supra note 342, at 328.
366. Problematics are defined as “tensions or concerns that inform a particular area
of study but often operate in the background.” Kirby et al., supra note 16, at 3.
367. Id. at 3.
368. Id. at 2.
369. Id.
370. Id. at 4.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 8-9.
373. Id. at 13 (citation omitted); see also Golden, supra note 336, at 236 (noting that
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according to this perspective, the primary concern for understand-
ing the boundary between work and family and the competing roles
within those boundaries is how the spheres of work and family are
defined by language, how they shift over time and space,374 and how
role management can be seen as not simply the effort to avoid con-
flict but to gain a “positive accomplishment of personhood” 375 within
structural constraints and material conditions.376
An empowerment view faults the formulaic work-family policies
for failing to recognize “relationships and positive aspects of work-
family negotiations.” 377 Instead, an empowerment view would create
room in those policies to recognize individual wisdom and the power
of “practical knowledge” in navigating everyday life378 and to “enact[ ]
different decision-making procedures in organizations,” that would
create opportunities for diverse voices in the process.379 This per-
spective also encourages “question[ing of] power relations and how
they developed over time in work-family . . . language,” 380 and seeks
to develop more “innovative avenues for incorporating voices into
policy formation.” 381
Finally, unlike the other problematics for considering work and
family issues, the empowerment approach includes a “communal
orientation,” which extends beyond considering the needs of individual
workers to examining and remedying the “structural and societal
causes” 382 of work-family conflict. An empowerment approach advo-
cates “reenvision[ing] the cultural norms and ideologies of our society
as a whole” 383 and promoting “participatory decision processes that
question current priorities regarding work, family, and community,”
as well as developing policies that address individual’s concerns, and
“incorporating [more] voices into policy formation.” 384
C. Another Vision: The Empowerment Identity Approach and
Rethinking School Involvement Leave Legislation
In her writings on work and family regulation, Nancy Dowd
argues that “vision” plays an important role in the development of
“[i]dentity, as it relates to work and parenting, is not static”).
374. Kirby et al., supra note 16, at 9, 13.
375. Id. at 14.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 18.
378. Id. at 19-20.
379. Id. at 30 (citation omitted).
380. Id. at 23.
381. Id. 33.
382. Id. 32.
383. Id. 33.
384. Id.
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policies that regulate the intersect of work and family life.385 Accord-
ingly, this section articulates and applies a new, normative vision — a
vision of empowerment identity — for crafting and critiquing work-
family regulation that can improve the way the work and family rela-
tionship is legally structured.386 The empowerment identity approach
can help to create a work-family policy that eradicates discriminatory
practices and structures associated with the ideal worker standard
and create time and opportunity for employees to better manage the
relationship between work and family, positive features of the anti-
discrimination and accommodation approaches to work-family issues.
But, it does more than that; it invokes a paradigm shift387 that focuses
on the communicative construction of meaning and agency, where
individualized solutions, appropriate for each worker-parent, are pre-
ferred over institutionalized ones,388 where worker-parents play a
greater role in defining what the workplace policies should be, and
where the pluralistic, heterogenous identities of worker-parents are
honored and recognized.
Taking an empowerment identity approach to work-family regu-
lation means recognizing that workplaces and workplace regulations
are sites (one material and the other symbolic) where individual
identities are communicatively and socially constructed and recon-
structed. Regulations, then, are discursive resources for enabling
worker-parents to construct identities that equip them to individually
influence the management of tensions at the intersection of work and
family life. As discussed below, three characteristics are distinctive
of the empowerment identity approach as applied to work-family
regulation: recognizing the complexity of a work-family life and the
need for greater accessibility to diverse worker-parent identities;
reframing the relationship between work and family as intersecting
385. Dowd, supra note 49, at 339 (“[V]ision defines the dialogue and sets the framework
of policy. If the vision is limited, then so are the policies that derive from it.”).
386. See Kirby et al., supra note 342, at 339 (“[S]cholars in the United States should
broaden their understanding of the ways policy issues directly affect issues and experi-
ences of work and life.”). Scholars should look at how “policies and values are enacted
locally[,] . . . . [to] unveil[ ] discursive closures, the ways that micropractices cause
certain ways of living to seem natural and neutral and in turn preclude alternative
possibilities.” Id. at 347.
387. Yamada, supra note 31, at 567 (“A ‘[p]aradigm shift’ . . . is exactly what we need
to reform the substance and procedure of American employment law.”).
388. This type of approach would recognize the conditions of modernity and the new
ways of being that come with it. “Social heterogeneity may be a permanent feature of
our cultural landscape, and it may be that there will continue to be ‘no right way to
behave.’ ” Golden, supra note 336, at 235. In other words, creating an institutionalized
structure and process by which a pluralistic workforce can develop individualized and
autonomous approaches to work may be the best way to approach modern
working conditions.
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commitments; and promoting invested worker-parent engagement
in the process of managing work-family relationships.389
Although the empowerment perspective originates in the context
of organizational communication to empower individuals to resist
dominant and disempowering discourses,390 when combined with
principles of identity theory, it can be a normative approach for cri-
tiquing and crafting empowering macrodiscourses of work-family,
such as legislation.391 That is, this approach establishes a framework
of norms for evaluating how public regulations constrain or empower
individual employees to enact an identity consistent with their own
understandings of the relationship between work and family, a pur-
pose that has not yet been fully explored in the context of work-family
regulation but has been identified as important.392 As such, the ap-
proach can provide a way of not only evaluating, understanding, and
critiquing work-family discourses, it can provide a framework for
developing new regulations that resolve the “workplace/workforce
mismatch” 393 and better serve the needs of individual employees,
their children, the employers, and their communities by helping to
address “the lack of fit between the structure and expectations of
U.S. workplaces and the reality of the lives of their workers.” 394
An empowerment identity approach is valuable because it
leans against395 common understandings of what regulation of the
389. In her work on remedying second generation discrimination by taking a structural
approach, Susan Sturm also described a regulatory model that takes into account many
of the concepts noted here, including: the need to recognize complexity of work-family
relationships, taking a holistic approach to the work-family question, and moving from
a rules enforcement perspective to a problem definition and problem solving approach.
Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 462-65 (2001).
390. Kirby et al., supra note 16,at 4 (discussing the authors’ intent to consider “how
people can communicatively construct empowered positions for themselves”).
391. This view turns upon an understanding that “structures influence how individuals
experience and communicate about [work and family issues]” and that “discourse[s]
from multiple levels [(interpersonal, organizational, societal)] can impact how individuals
‘manage’ the interrelated realms” of work and family. Kirby et al., supra note 342, at
328-29.
392. Id. at 339 (noting that “[e]conomic and political contexts have been largely
ignored in studying [work and family issues]” and that scholars “should broaden their
understanding of the ways policy issues directly affect issues and experiences of work
and life”).
393. Williams & Bornstein, supra note 7, at 1320.
394. Id.
395. In the 1930s, Kenneth Burke, a literary and social critic, recognized that offering
perspectives that lean against dominant work discourses have value in and of themselves
as aesthetic adjustments to the “cultural code behind our contemporary economic ambi-
tiousness.” KENNETH BURKE, COUNTER-STATEMENT 121-22 (2d ed. 1953). Although Burke
was speaking to the shortcomings he saw in turn-of-the-century capitalism and indus-
trialization, his words are equally applicable to current work-family issues.
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employment relationship should be.396 That is, instead of seeing the
relationship between employer and employee as one of appropriately
unequal power, particularly where the relationship is “at-will,” 397
an empowerment identity approach can encourage critiquing our
conventional understandings of the employee-employer relationship
and questioning whether the relationship should be reframed in the
modern economy.398 For that reason, an empowerment identity ap-
proach can be a foil to dominant discourses and keep “society from
becoming too assertively, too hopelessly, itself.” 399
In addition, an empowerment identity approach can call attention
to the normative possibilities of law in contemporary society and
potentially provide a discursive bridge between individual liberal-
ism and communitarian perspectives regarding the legitimacy of
regulating the employment relationship.400 Although a discussion
of the conflict between individual liberalism and communitarian per-
spectives is outside the scope of this paper,401 generally, an empower-
ment identity approach to work-family regulation recognizes that,
396. For a discussion of the traditional “[m]arkets and [m]anagement [f]ramework”
of regulating the employment relationship, see Yamada, supra note 31, at 526-29.
397. See id. at 534-37 (discussing the limitations of at-will employment relationship).
398. For example, in relation to the family, the marketplace is traditionally seen as
a public sphere, where individuals enter, voluntarily, to engage in economic activity. In
relation to the state, however, the market is a private sphere designed to be free from
government intervention. Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths:
Independence, Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 13,
15 n.5 (2000). Thus, in the context where economic activity and family responsibilities
conflict, worker-parents are typically seen as navigating a private-private relationship
where their family responsibilities are the product of private choice and their employer-
employee relationships are the product of private contract. See Eichner, supra note 52,
at 157-58 (discussing the characterization of both work and family as private spheres
that resist regulations). Both of these are, according to liberal individualism, to be free of
government regulation. Fineman, supra, at 15 n.5. An empowerment identity model can
encourage questioning how public and institutional discourses maintain this “private-
private” divide and corresponding identities.
399. BURKE, supra note 394, at 105.
400. According to the individual liberalism model,
society is composed of a collection of discrete, autonomous individuals en-
gaged in the pursuit of diverse, equally acceptable plans of life. The state’s
role in this scheme is to prevent incursions on individuals’ liberty to pursue
their individual life plans, rather than to further any particular vision of the
good life. Under this view, individuals have no obligations to one another
unless they freely consent to them.
Eichner, supra note 52, at 151 (describing view). Critics of liberal individualism say that
the approach fails in the context of work-family issues because it does not account for
the interconnectivity and dependency relationships working parents have with their
children. Id. at 161. This communitarian viewpoint suggests that parenting policies
should emphasize interconnectedness and social responsibility. Fineman, supra note
397, at 19.
401. See Eichner, supra note 52 for further discussion.
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in a society where the obligations of dependency relationships can
no longer be realistically assigned exclusively to the private sphere,
maximizing the liberty of worker-parents may require greater regu-
lation of the relationship between employers and employees.402
Although perhaps facially paradoxical, regulating work-family
relationships from an empowerment identity perspective can be a
means of advancing the goals of both liberal individualism and commu-
nitarianism. An empowerment identity approach facilitates worker-
parents in making authentic choices, exercising free-will, having
autonomy, and avoiding “derivative dependency.” 403 In addition, it
recognizes and supports the interconnectedness workers have with
others beyond the workplace and affirms the legal, social, and moral
responsibility that parents have to care for their children.404 The
empowerment identity approach can foster regulation that creates
discursive spaces for worker-parents to contemporaneously
develop an identity that integrates (rather than bifurcates) auton-
omy and interconnectedness.
The empowerment identity approach is uniquely grounded in
identity theory and organizational communication research and thus
provides its own alternative “frame of reference,” thus fulfilling a
need that other legal scholars have recognized.405 Yet, it shares char-
acteristics with other approaches recently articulated in scholarly
legal literature, particularly the “incentivized organizational justice”
approach406 and the “information-shifting” approach,407 these shared
traits demonstrate that identity, communicative processes, and
employee empowerment are beginning to be recognized within the
402. Seana Shiffrin discusses this theoretical perspective, which she describes
as “accommodation,” in her work and from which I have adapted the concept. While I
agree with her in idea, I do not agree with her use of the term “accommodation” to
express it. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Paternalism, Unconscionability Doctrine, and
Accommodation, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 236 (2000) (noting that respecting autonomy
goes beyond “merely fulfilling autonomy rights,” and “within a complex, interdependent
community, respect for autonomy must involve more than mere respect for autonomy
rights . . . . It must also incorporate some degree of accommodation. . . . That is, citizens
should [both] tolerate [and subsidize] some level of burdensome other-regarding be-
havior.”); see also Eichner, supra note 52, at 177 (asserting that parents should define
parenting needs as they see fit and receive public support for doing so).
403. “Derivative dependency” is experienced by caregivers where the “major economic
and career costs associated with caretaking are typically borne by the caretaker alone.”
Fineman, supra note 397, at 21.
404. Cf. Eichner, supra note 52, at 171 (discussing the need for an approach empha-
sizing interconnectedness).
405. Arnow-Richman, supra note 5, at 28 (recognizing need for alternative frames).
406. Id. at 28, 45.
407. Naomi Schoenbaum, It’s Time That You Know: The Shortcomings of Ignorance
as Fairness In Employment Law and the Need for an “Information-Shifting” Model, 30
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 99, 135 (2007).
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scholarly legal community as legitimate concepts for envisioning
work-family regulation.
Rachel Arnow-Richman has proposed an “incentivized organiza-
tional justice” approach to regulate the relationship between work and
family.408 She suggests that the purpose of work-family regulation
should be to create procedures that “encourage proactive personnel
practices, in particular employer-administered policies for soliciting
and responding to the [accommodation] requests of non-traditional
employees.” 409 Accordingly, she proposes, among other changes,
amending the FMLA to require employers to engage in negotiations
with workers regarding needed accommodations for a “caregiving-
related event” that qualifies under the FMLA.410 In her model, the
law serves as a facilitator of an interactive process between employers
and employees that is collaboratively defined by those private actors,
that supports voluntary and tailored accommodations, and that will
increase the voice of employees in the decision-making process.411
Naomi Schoenbaum’s information-shifting approach to work-
place regulation begins with the premise that exclusion of certain
kinds of information from the workplace, such as information about
a worker’s parenting needs, unfairly masks the identities of individual
employees and thus results in unfairness.412 To correct this unfair-
ness, “employees [need] to have their particular identities and needs
recognized,” 413 and thus information about differences among em-
ployees must be legitimated and shared in the workplace. To correct
the problem of “ignorance” in the workplace, Schoenbaum suggests
that regulations facilitate a genuine dialogue between employees
and employers that reveals a “particularized other[ ].” 414 This dia-
logue allows employees to “articulate their own needs in their own
voices” 415 and can make the family identities of worker-parents rele-
vant to public discussions and make room for different perspectives
in the workplace. With respect to childcare obligations in particular,
Schoenbaum asserts that the information-shifting model allows
employees to request accommodations based on “what being a parent
means to them.” 416
408. Arnow-Richman, supra note 5, at 45.
409. Id.
410. Id. at 56-57.
411. Id. 63-64.
412. Schoenbaum, supra note 406, at 99-101.
413. Id. at 136.
414. Id. at 109. Schoenbaum’s work relies on the “discourse ethics” model developed
by Jürgen Habermas and further expounded upon by Seyla Benhabib. In that model,
fairness is possible only when claims are subjected to “intersubjective argumentation”
between a “concrete” and not a “generalized other.” Id. at 131-35.
415. Id. at 134.
416. Id. at 148.
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The empowerment identity approach to work-family regulation,
as described below in more detail, is similar to these approaches. The
empowerment identity approach promotes increased information
sharing and dialogue between employers and employees, seeks to pro-
mote worker participation in decision-making processes, and creates
a foundation for developing concrete solutions to worker-parent issues.
Moreover, the approach builds on the information-shifting model by
seeking to employ the regulatory structure as a script for authentic,
context-relevant information sharing in individual, concrete interac-
tions between worker-parents and employers.
The empowerment identity perspective diverges from both
the incentivized organizational justice and information-shifting ap-
proaches on the question of accommodation. Both of these approaches
frame work-family issues through the lens of accommodation.417 The
empowerment identity approach, however, avoids an accommodation
frame so as to not reify the ideal worker standard and over-focus on
logistical solutions to work-family tensions.
The empowerment identity approach is characterized by three
distinct sensitizing concepts that frame the creation and critique of
work-family legislative solutions. First, the approach embraces rather
than masks the complexity of worker-parent identities and seeks to
emphasize ways to make those identities more accessible. Second, it
demands that the relationship between work and family be con-
structed as points of dynamic intersection rather than as separate,
bounded spheres in a static state. Finally, it privileges the process of
engaged negotiated problem-solving between employer and employee
over traditional relationships of control and reporting.
Applying the empowerment identity approach as a frame of ref-
erence demonstrates that although the school involvement leave stat-
utes create conditions where a parent-as-involved-in-school identity
is acknowledged in the regulatory language, worker identity is still
privileged over parent identity, worker-parent identities are not
sufficiently plural, and access to those identities is limited in the
regulatory scheme. Moreover, the statutes construct the boundaries
between work and family life as rigid and impermeable, focusing
more on what activities are allowed and prohibited in each sphere
rather than on creating conditions where parents can self-define and
integrate an identity as worker-parents. Engagement between worker-
parent and employer is limited in that formulas are offered in the stat-
utes as a means for reporting, but a process for negotiating a mutually
417. See supra notes 407-15 and accompanying text.
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satisfactory leave remains largely undeveloped. Finally, many of the
statutes illustrate how employer voice is privileged over that of the
worker-parent, thereby diminishing worker-parent motivation to
engage in an invested way in negotiating leave.
1. Complexity and Accessibility
Because the workforce has become more pluralistic and other
communities are more fragmented, less physical, more virtual, and
constantly shifting, work is an increasingly important institution for
crafting individual identities.418 An empowerment identity approach to
workplace regulation is suited to the characteristics of the modern
workforce and to the increasing importance of the workplace as a site
for identity development, because it seeks to address the complexities
of and accessibility to worker-identities. Work-family regulations
following an empowerment identity approach can create a structure
that overtly accounts for, celebrates, and communicates the complexity
of worker-parent identities and facilitates self-definition as a worker-
parent. In addition, they can ensure that a broad range of workers
have access to those identities and the accompanying processes.
Specifically, regulations designed using an empowerment iden-
tity approach would enable worker-parents to enact multiple identities
rather than reinforce monologic ones. For example, the ideal worker
standard, which views ideal workers as free of family demands, re-
quires that worker-parents, by virtue of their hyphenated identity
fall outside the “worker” ideal and thus requires accommodation when
the parent identity is salient in the workplace. A statute that takes
an empowerment identity approach, however, would challenge the
current ideal worker norm419 by recognizing that worker-parents
418. See Golden, supra note 336, at 233-34 (describing the impact of technology and
social heterogeneity on identity construction); Tracy & Trethewey, supra note 306, at
169 (noting that “[s]cholarship increasingly indicates that individuals form their identities
based on organizational and workgroups”).
419. The “balanced worker” norm — a workplace norm based on the “assumption that
most adults have ongoing caregiving responsibilities” — is one attempt to challenge the
ideal worker standard. Williams & Bornstein, supra note 7, at 1325. Although Kirby
and her colleagues challenge “balance” as a favorable term for the management of the
relationship between work and family, Kirby et al., supra note 16, at 34 n.1, they would
likely agree with Williams’s repositioning of the term as an adjective describing an
individual’s state of being — a worker with ongoing caregiving responsibilities — rather
than as an abstract noun that suggests that work-family balance exists outside the worker
and is a predetermined, static object an individual must obtain as a possession. The use
of “balance” as a verb (evoking images of walking with a book on one’s head) would make
even greater strides to capture the dynamic, evolving, constantly shifting nature of the
relationship between working and parenting.
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have multi-faceted, plural, and competing identities, and would avoid
overly determinative definitions of worker-parent or accommodation
mandates based on parent identities. Such a statute would avoid
the problem of categorical distortion by proposing sufficiently open
definitions to encompass multiple understandings of what it means
to be a worker-parent. In other words, the regulation would recognize
the increasing social complexities and uncertainties that accompany
working and parenting and make those multiple identities available
for discussion. Instead of simplifying the problems associated with
that complexity, it would make the complexity visible.
Not only would a regulation enacted using an empowerment
identity approach seek to acknowledge the complexity in defining
who is a parent, it would also focus on ensuring that the regulatory
processes are accessible to all kinds of worker-parents, at all socio-
economic levels, and in all types of workplaces, and it would avoid
“[p]resumptions of positionality.” 420 For example, much of the work-
family research has been based on the experiences of upper-income,
highly-skilled, heterosexual, married, English-speaking white women
in relatively stable workplace environments.421 Accordingly, the dis-
cursive resources necessary to craft authentic identities as worker-
parents for those outside the typically imagined group, such as
worker-parents in the low-income, unskilled job market; gay and
lesbian worker-parents; non-English speaking worker-parents; worker-
parents who are transient workers or work in unstable workplaces;
male worker-parents; and worker-parents of non-white ethnic groups
can be missing from the work-family regulatory schemes. An empower-
ment identity approach would result in legislation that is accessible
to all types of worker-parents, both as a practical matter and as a
matter of creating symbolic spaces that embrace a variety of worker-
parent identities and honor different conceptualizations of working
and parenting.
In the context of the school involvement leave, many statutes
limit the worker-parent who can participate in school activities to
the traditional parent or guardian and ignore the role that extended
family, friends, or others might have in a child’s educational devel-
opment. In most states, a custodial relationship is essential to being
420. See Kirby et al., supra note 342, at 339 (noting that “[p]resumptions of position-
ality” make the current discussion of work and family issues a “classist discourse,” which
suggests that “certain positions of economic or political privilege” are tied to the ideal
resolution of work and family issues).
421. See id. at 339 (noting that “work/life scholars have been quick to focus on certain
groups of people (specifically White, middle-class women) in their studies while ignoring
others” (citation omitted)).
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covered under the statute; the child must be a natural, foster, adopted,
or stepchild of the worker-parent in order for leave to apply.422 In
Washington, D.C., however, aunts, uncles, and grandparents as well
as anyone who “acts as a guardian” (but is not legally the guardian)
can use the school involvement leave.423 While this definition is expan-
sive, it is uncommon. For example, even if a child spends more time
with a noncustodial grandparent than a custodial parent, and that
grandparent would be the person who identifies as the person who
would be involved in the child’s education, most of the statutes would
not permit the grandparent to take school involvement leave. Addi-
tionally, other individuals, whether related or unrelated, may identify
as the person who serves as the child’s educational supporter. Yet,
most of the statutes do not allow for this type of identification.424
Further, some states exclude new and potentially transient or
temporary worker-parents from the scope of the statutes, both of
which are groups of parents that could benefit from crafting identities
that include greater participation in the educational development
of their children. For example, four states that mandate some school
involvement leave restrict leave to worker-parents who have worked
at a location for a specific length of time ranging from six months to
a year.425 Others have specifically excluded independent contractors.426
Colorado, in particular, excludes domestic servants, seasonal workers,
and farm laborers.427 As a result, parents who have been in the work-
force only for a short time or are temporary or transient workers are
excluded from leave statute protection. Implicit in these tenure and
type limitations are issues of class, gender, and socioeconomic status.
Statistics show temporary and transient workers are often women
or minority individuals in low-wage positions.428
These identity limitations are highlighted by attempts in
Minnesota in 2007 to expand a worker’s opportunity to participate
in a child’s educational activities to a “significant individual,” defined
as a person who “reside[s] with the child and participate[s] actively
422. See supra Part II.B.2.
423. D.C. CODE § 32-1201(2)(C) (2010).
424. See supra Part II.B.2.
425. See supra Part II.B.2.
426. Colorado, Illinois, and Minnesota all specifically exclude independent contractors.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-13.3-102(3)(b) (2009); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 147-10(a)(2) (West
2008); MINN. STAT. § 181.940 subdiv. 2 (2009).
427. § 8-13.3-102(3)(b).
428. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, REPORT ON THE AMERICAN WORKFORCE, 19, 24, 41 (1999),
available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/rtaw/pdf/rtaw1999.pdf (tracking demographics in
the American workforce, and noting the fact that “the majority of temporary help workers
are women”).
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in the child’s care and upbringing.” 429 Although the proposed stat-
ute was more expansive, it still limited the leave to a person who
“reside[s]” with the child.430 For example, even with this more expan-
sive definition, a gay partner of a non-custodial biological parent who
would like to, and perhaps already does, participate in a child’s educa-
tional activities, would still not qualify for school involvement leave.
From an empowerment identity perspective, the concept of a
“significant individual” is compelling and may be the kind of empow-
ering term that creates space to recognize the modern complexities
of parenting and increase accessibility to parenting identities. This
term acknowledges that there are relationships of significance between
employed individuals and children that do not turn on traditional
definitions of parenting. The idea of being a significant individual
is empowering; it allows an employee to self-identify his or her own
significance in relation to a child’s school activity and to request time
away from work when those opportunities of significance arise. More-
over, this self-identification process honors the practical wisdom of
workers who care for children, in whatever capacity, in understand-
ing the scope of their own relationships with the children in their
lives and what is necessary to develop those relationships while at
the same time honoring work commitments.
2. Intersectionality
Regulations taking an empowerment identity approach would
also promote the view that work, family, and other commitments are
intersecting, equally important, and neither hierarchically arranged
nor in separate spheres. The statutes would recognize autonomy and
dependency as coextensive, interconnected states of being rather
than as competing and bounded experiences of different worth. They
would facilitate opportunities for a worker-parent to self-define how
the responsibilities of parenting and work intersect for that worker-
parent, taking into account the competing responsibilities of a worker-
parent. Additionally, a statute crafted using an empowerment identity
perspective would recognize that parenting changes over time. That
is, for example, the identity needs of a parent with a young child may
be different than the identity needs of the parents of a teenager.
The school involvement leave statutes demonstrate a primar-
ily bounded approach to work and family rather than one based on
intersectionality. First, some statutes take a fairly rigid view of the
429. H.B. 744, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Min. 2007).
430. Id.
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boundaries between work and parent responsibility for school activ-
ities by having narrowly limited definitions of what counts as a school
activity. In Illinois for example, school activities are physically con-
fined to interactions in a school building and are characterized as
only “conferences or classroom activities” that must occur during
work hours.431 The statute does not take into account other ways
school intersects with the parental role, such as during field trips,
at sporting events, or when enrolling a child in a school. It does not
recognize that, for some parents, the need to devote time to children’s
school activities may be at a time when the parent works but school
is not in session. For example, for a parent who works the afternoon
shift, from 3 P.M. to 11 P.M., guaranteed time away from work to help
a child with a special school project is not available because it is not
a conference or a classroom activity. Yet, parents’ availability to their
children in the evenings and the link to school success has been docu-
mented. Research has found that “the more hours parents are away
from home after school and in the evening, the more likely their
children are to test in the bottom quartile on achievement tests.” 432
A statute that takes an empowerment identity approach would recog-
nize that educational stewardship is needed in locations other than
in the school itself and would give parents a frame of reference for
understanding themselves as participants in their children’s edu-
cation in multiple settings.
Other states construct an even more rigid boundary around school
activities. Hawaii and Texas limit eligible school activity to parent-
teacher conferences,433 and in Colorado, an “academic activity” is
limited to a parent-teacher conference or another meeting to deal
with a statutorily defined issue, such as special education, truancy,
or discipline.434 In these states, presumably, the only cognizable inter-
section for worker-parents with a school environment is with the
teacher or other school administrators. Even though the Colorado
statute uniquely reaches children who are homeschooled and thus
begins to expand the identity of who needs to attend a child’s activities,
the purpose of the leave is still limited to the need for a “meeting[]
or conference[ ]” 435 based on narrowly statutorily defined subjects, so
it does little to change the boundaries surrounding school activities.
431. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 147/15 (West 2008).
432. HEYMANN, supra note 4, at 57.
433. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78-31 (LexisNexis 2009); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 661.206(a)-(b) (Vernon 2004).
434. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-13.3-102(1) (2009).
435. Id.
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These statutes demonstrate the danger of constructing worker-
parent identity around the concept of competing spheres of “face
time” — face time, as Kirby and her colleagues note, spent demon-
strating loyalty to an employer bounded by face time spent demon-
strating loyalty to a school space (i.e., a classroom) or to a school
authority (i.e., the teacher).436 In other words, by creating boundaries
that emphasize face time, or perhaps “space time,” as the measure
of commitment to work and to a child’s education, these statutes script
a worker-parent identity that mimics the ideal worker standard that
values time in a particular location — at school or with a teacher —
over the contribution made in that location.
Other school involvement statutes, on the other hand, create
more possibilities for intersection between a worker-parent and school
activities by expanding the definition of activity to include a greater
variety of places and spaces that could impact a child’s education and
placing less emphasis on interactions with an educational authority
figure or in a traditional educational space. Washington, D.C., has
the best example of this type of expansive statute.437 There, a school
activity includes “an[y] activity sponsored by either a school or an
associated organization.” 438 This definition appears to encompass
activities that take place both on and off school grounds, inside and
outside of the classroom, directly and indirectly related to traditional
learning, and during school and non-school hours. Rhode Island in-
cludes “school-related activities” 439 in its definition, which suggests
that the boundaries of school are also more flexible. So, in Rhode
Island, perhaps, it might be possible for a parent who works at night
to take time off of work to help a child with a school project since that
project is school-related even though the activity for which the parent’s
assistance is needed does not take place during school hours.
Interestingly, none of the statutes legitimize a school intersection
at the point where a parent needs time from work to facilitate a child’s
participation in a non-school-affiliated enrichment activity that en-
hances a child’s educational and personal development.440 For example,
436. See Kirby et al., supra note 16, at 5-6 (describing the concept of face time).
437. D.C. CODE § 32-1202 (2010).
438. Id. § 32-1201(3).
439. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-48-12(a) (2010).
440. The benefits of participating in “after-school” programs, defined as those programs
which provide school-aged “children . . . with a range of supervised activities intentionally
designed to encourage learning and development outside of the typical school day,” are
well-documented as having academic, social, emotional, and health benefits for the chil-
dren who participate in them. Harvard Family Research Project, After School Programs
in the 21st Century: Their Potential and What It Takes to Achieve It, 10 ISSUES AND
OPPORTUNITIES IN OUT-OF-SCHOOL TIME EVALUATION 1, 2 (Feb. 2008), available at
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to participate in after-school activities such as music lessons, art
lessons, or sports, children may need a parent to transport them to
and from the activity. For families with a full-time stay-at-home
parent, this is not an issue. But, for worker-parents and their children,
after-school activities not affiliated with the school or taking place
off school grounds may be unavailable, both as a practical and a legal
matter. That is, because a parent cannot get time from work to take
a child to these activities, children may not participate in them. Thus
when schools eliminate after school supervised enrichment activities,
some children may find enrichment activities virtually unattainable.
The absence of enrichment activities from the statutes is signifi-
cant as an identity issue. That is, without having enrichment activities
reflected in the statute, parents may have no discursive resource to
draw upon that would allow their stewardship of enrichment activities
to be a legitimate part of their identity in the workplace. For example,
without the recognition of enrichment activities in the statutes, a
worker-parent of a gifted musician could not discuss with his em-
ployer the possibility of taking statutorily available leave to accom-
pany his daughter to a private music lesson or to attend a related
recital. Thus, even though it seems practical for a worker-parent to
envision himself as a steward for his child’s in-school and outside-of-
school educational activities, a shortcoming of the statutes is that they
do not provide a resource for a parent to adopt such an identity.
Embedded within the enrichment activity issue is an issue of
socioeconomic class: “children . . . whose families have higher incomes
and more education . . . [a]re more likely to participate in enrich-
ment programs, while their disadvantaged peers . . . [do not] reap[ ]
the benefits associated with enrichment experiences.” 441 Accordingly,
low income workers’ access through regulation to a worker-parent
identity that includes involvement in enrichment activities may be
crucial to children actually participating in these activities. So, to
the extent the benefits of enrichment activities are valued for all
children, the school involvement leave statutes can provide discur-
sive resources for empowering parents to identify and participate
at this intersection.
3. Promoting Invested Engagement
Regulations taking an empowerment identity approach would
create a framework for dialogue that invests a worker-parent in the
http://www.hfrp.org/publications-resources/browse-our-publications/after-school-programs
-in-the-21st-century-their-potential-and-what-it-takes-to-achieve-it.
441. Id. at 6.
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process of managing his or her own worker-parent relationships.442
As with Arnow-Richman’s incentivized organizational justice approach,
the empowerment identity approach to regulation would give worker-
parents a voice in the decision-making process. They would promote
dialogue between worker-parents and employers to negotiate indi-
vidualized identities, rather than create conditions where worker-
parents are expected to report predetermined identities. Instead of
enforcement, predictability, and control — all characteristics associ-
ated with an “expert rationality” for managing work and family443 —
the focus of regulations taking an empowerment identity approach
would be to use worker-parent-generated wisdom to solve problems
confronting worker-parents. Moreover, the processes for engaging
and negotiating would enable invested participation among individuals
with a wide range of language, literacy, and advocacy skills. That
is, the statutes would focus attention on mechanisms for notifying
worker-parents about legislatively available work-family approaches,
use multiple languages and content addressed to convey different
educational levels for conveying information about these approaches,
and give guidance to employees on ways to communicate their work-
family needs to employers.
Unlike an accommodation approach to work-family regulations,
the goal of regulations taking an empowerment identity approach
would not be to focus on describing rules for time and space man-
agement of parenting conflicts within the workplace. Instead, the
goal would be to create structures that provide resources to worker-
parents for exercising individual agency and meaning-making, both
of which would facilitate one’s ability to manage work and family
issues. And with respect to the locus of control, an empowerment
identity model would not just preclude employers’ discriminatory
actions but instead facilitate multiple ways that employers and
worker-parents might each exercise control in crafting relationships
between work and family.
The existing school involvement leave statutes firmly place the
locus of control of identity construction with employers. First, the
442. The empowerment approach to work-family issues requires that employees live
up to their own work obligations as well as their family ones, thus expecting employee
investment not only in the family but in the workplace. As David Yamada explains in
his discussion of the “dignitarian” model of employment law, “[w]orkers who are compen-
sated fairly and treated with dignity have a corresponding obligation to perform their
jobs competently and ethically.” Yamada, supra note 31, at 552. Moreover, research shows
that workplace policies that help employees better manage work and family increase
morale, job satisfaction, commitment among the workforce, and productivity. Kirby et
al., supra note 342, at 336-37.
443. Kirby et al., supra note 16, at 17.
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statutes contain formulas that emphasize predictability and control
over individualized problem-solving approaches. Examples of the for-
mulaic statutory response are found in the requirements that prescribe
exact standards for worker-parents in verifying their whereabouts.
For example, in Illinois, employees are required to submit verification
of “exact time and date” of visit to school.444 In Massachusetts, a
certification that gives the date, duration, and purpose of the leave
can be requested, and an employer can ask for even more verification
if that verification is not unduly burdensome.445 These formulas privi-
lege reporting and control over discussion and participatory problem-
solving by encouraging formal communication patterns that are
disciplined by universalized requirements rather than encourag-
ing particularized and open communication between employers and
worker-parents in specific situations. This type of formalized report-
ing requires that school activities be limited to the kinds of activities
that can be supervised by the school, such as classroom activities and
parent-teacher conferences, so that the worker-parent’s attendance can
be reported. Accordingly, the reporting requirements suggest a lack
of trustworthiness on the part of the worker-parent,446 an attribute
which does not encourage positive, invested, and engaged problem-
solving activity on the part of either the employee or the employer.
Second, the statutes favor a managerial voice over an employee
one. The managerial voice in some statutes is expressed in the way
the employer’s interests trumps the employee’s interests in the
event of an irreconcilable conflict. For example, in the Washington,
D.C., statute, an employer can deny leave if it “would disrupt the
employer’s business and make the achievement of production or ser-
vice delivery unusually difficult.” 447 Similarly, in Illinois, employers
are not required to give employees school involvement leave if doing
so would result in more than five percent of the workforce taking
involvement leave on the same day.448 In California, employers can
deny leave to parents in the workplace who want to take leave simul-
444. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 147/30 (West 2008).
445. 940 MASS. REG. CODE 20.02 (sufficient certification), 20.04 (additional
verification) (2009).
446. Skepticism about the commitment and ethic of the worker is not new. Yamada
notes that need for time and motion studies proposed by Frederick Taylor in the early
twentieth century were based in part upon the need for standards so that worker could
not “manipulate their jobs and connive to set output levels far below their actual
capacity.” Yamada, supra note 31, at 527-28; see also Davis, supra note 18, at 542-43
(noting concerns by employers that employees abuse the FMLA).
447. D.C. CODE § 32-1202(c) (2010).
448. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 147/49 (West 2008).
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taneously.449 In Minnesota and Rhode Island, the worker-parent must
make reasonable attempts not to “disrupt unduly” the employer’s
business operations.450
These statutes do not articulate a process for taking into account
additional considerations when an employer’s legitimate interest
and others’ legitimate interests, including the interests of schools
and children, come into conflict with the employer’s interest. For
example, if five of an employer’s one hundred employees seek school
involvement leave in Illinois on the same day, the employer can deny
the leave to those five employees, regardless of the importance of the
school activity, the relative needs of the worker-parents, or the ability
of the workplace to successfully function while these parents are
away from work.451 This statute, like all the others, has no language
available to account for a worker-parent’s wellness or mental health,
a child’s individual needs, or the needs of the school as factors in the
decision-making process. By privileging the employer perspective
in the statute in this way, the participation of worker-parents in
problem solving and decision making is limited. This limitation can
make it even more difficult for a worker-parent to see herself as an
invested participant in crafting an identity that can effectively com-
bine work and parenting.
Some of the statutes do more to empower employees to participate
in the decision-making process. Illinois, for example, requires that
employees “consult” with their employer to make sure that leave does
not “disrupt unduly” the employer’s operations.452 The word “consult”
in the statute connotes a negotiating rather than a reporting activity,
which suggests employee participation in the process. Moreover, in
Illinois, a worker-parent has the right to make up work hours missed
for school involvement activities, and employers must make good
faith efforts to enable the worker-parent to make up that work.453
Colorado takes a similar approach to substituting paid leave and
making up missed work.454 Again, these provisions structure an envi-
ronment where an employee can adopt an identity that encompasses
both a responsibility to a child’s education and a certain amount
autonomy and responsibility for managing that commitment in con-
junction with work obligations. Although these provisions still speak
with an economic voice that privileges the employer’s interests and
449. CAL. LAB. CODE § 230.8(a)(2) (West 2010).
450. MINN. STAT. § 181.9412 subdiv. 2 (2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-48-12(b) (2010).
451. See supra text accompanying note 444.
452. 147/15(a).
453. Id. 147/20.
454. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-13.3-103(1)(a) (2009).
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fails to include non-economic factors (such as employee wellness, for
example) in the equation, they provide examples of regulatory spaces
where consultation and negotiation between employers and worker-
parents can happen and demonstrate how regulatory language can
go further to empower worker-parents.
CONCLUSION
Issues related to work and family are not going to ebb any time
soon. In fact, in light of the economic downturn, the continuing
increase of dual-earner and single-parent households, and the in-
creasing diversity of worker-parent backgrounds, experiences, and
expectations, these issues are more acute than ever and call for more
innovative455 legal approaches. One response is to continue to envi-
sion work-family legislation as a way to accommodate the legitimate
needs of worker-parents or as a way to protect worker-parents from
unacceptable discriminatory practices. While these approaches both
have merit, neither facilitates the development of worker-parent iden-
tities that challenge the prevailing narratives of work and family and
are consistent with today’s working realities. One way forward on
work-family issues in the legal context, it seems, is to have legislation
that creates ways for worker-parents to develop integrated identities
and for workplaces to recognize the legitimacy of those identities.
An empowerment identity approach provides a framework for making
this legislative turn.
In the context of school involvement leave statutes, the question
remains how to craft statutes, or perhaps a model statute, that would
meet the identity needs associated with modern conditions of work-
ing and parenting. While that project is one for the future, however,
at minimum an empowerment identity approach to school involve-
ment leave legislation suggests three possibilities for improving the
statutory language.
First, definitions within the statutes could be expanded to give
employees more discursive resources for crafting an identity as a
455. Innovative does not necessarily mean “something new under the sun.” BURKE,
supra note 394, at 110. Rather, an innovation can be “an emphasis to which the con-
temporary public is not accustomed.” Id. “Any ‘transvaluation of values’ [can be] an
innovation,” even if it harkens back to earlier values. Id. An emphasis on the con-
nections between, rather than the separation of, work and family is not particularly novel;
connection between the two was the state of affairs that dominated agrarian living and
preceded the cult of domesticity and the industrial revolution. WILLIAMS, supra note 2,
at 20-21. Re-emphasizing and rethinking those connections is the emphasis here.
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worker-parent. The statutes could offer more open definitions for
“parent” 456 or “child” and could also expand the types of activities
that merit school involvement leave. The statutes could also acknowl-
edge that the types of involvement worker-parents need could change
over the course of a child’s educational development and provide for
ways of negotiating those changes.
Second, emphasis could be removed from reporting and compli-
ance and instead be placed on accessibility and negotiation. Formal
reporting requirements could be eliminated, and instead guidelines
about how employers and worker-parents could communicate with
one another in negotiating and taking leave could be offered. The idea
of legislatively creating structures and processes for a negotiating
flexibility for parenting responsibilities is already recognized: it is
expressed in “right to request” laws already enacted in Europe457
and proposed in New Hampshire.458 Moreover, to make the processes
for communication and negotiation accessible to all worker-parents
regardless of skill or ability in negotiating, legislation could describe
ways to facilitate interactions that lead to positive outcomes for both
worker-parents and employers. For example, a code of ethics459 for
negotiations could be established in addition to a description of the
steps for consideration, reconsideration, and appeal of a request to
take school involvement leave. Developing such a code and educating
both worker-parents and employers could have a significant impact
on how the statutes are used to accomplish individualized identi-
ties, perhaps allow greater leave access by parents whose children
could benefit the most from it, and at the same time ensure that the
employer’s interest in a productive workforce is maintained.460
456. For a discussion of expanding legally cognizable caregivers beyond the traditional
parent, see Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding
of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385, 387-88 (2008).
457. For example, in the United Kingdom, certain employees with children have a
statutorily protected right to ask for changes in work hours, times, and location of work
when the purpose is for caregiving. JODIE LEVIN-EPSTEIN, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY,
HOW TO EXERCISE FLEXIBLE WORK: TAKE STEPS WITH A “SOFT TOUCH” LAW 2-3 (2005)
(describing statute and its impact); Directgov, Flexible Working and Work-Life Balance,
http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/Employment/Employees/Flexibleworking/index.htm (follow
“The Right to Request Flexible Working” hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 8, 2010) (describing
the right to request law).
458. H.B. 663, 161st Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2009) (creating a process for employees
to request flexible work schedules).
459. See Davis, supra note 18, at 554 (calling for a code of ethics that “might require
mutual respect, honesty, candor, and the pursuit of harmony” in dealing with work-
family issues).
460. Id. at 552 (noting that “ ‘facilitating transitions’ between work and family [could]
increase the level of performance and productivity in both settings”); see also JODY
HEYMANN & ALISON EARLE, RAISING THE GLOBAL FLOOR: DISMANTLING THE MYTH THAT
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Finally, providing mechanisms for increasing worker-parent
involvement in setting school involvement leave policies and creating
mechanisms for reconciliation in the statutory language itself could
facilitate the kind of identity development that an empowerment
identity approach favors. Two possibilities for increasing authentic
worker-parent personhood in the workplace461 include requiring
committees within organizations that have both employers and em-
ployees as members to create and evaluate school involvement leave
policies, and providing for internal or external “ombudsmen” 462 to
facilitate resolutions.
Rhetorically reframing the issue of whether and how to regulate
the relationship between work and family is a project that interested
scholars should pursue with vigor as questions about the continued
viability and effectiveness of the antidiscrimination and accommoda-
tion approaches emerge. For example, Justice Scalia’s recent concur-
ring opinion in Ricci v. DeStefano,463 calls into question the viability
of aspects of the antidiscrimination approach by questioning whether
Title VII’s disparate impact theory would withstand future (and
assertedly unavoidable) constitutional scrutiny.464 Along with Arnow-
Richman’s incentivized organizational justice and Schoenbaum’s
information shifting approaches, the empowerment identity approach
provides a rhetorical reframing as well as an alternative foundation
for both critiquing existing and crafting new legislation. These views,
when taken together, call for more attention to be paid to how regula-
tory language encourages cooperation, communication, transparency,
decision-making processes, information-shifting, and self-responsi-
bility. They call for more voices to be heard in the legislative language.
WE CAN’T AFFORD GOOD WORKING CONDITIONS FOR EVERYONE 64-68 (2010) (describing
research which shows that “allowing employees to work a decent number of hours and
giving them the time they need to care for their own health and that of their families
enables them to be more productive at work” and increases retention).
461. Increasing worker voice in the discussion of workplace policies is important;
“workers’ voices have been systematically excluded from public discourse about the
present and future [of the] American workplace.” George Cheney, Democracy in the
Workplace: Theory and Practice from the Perspective of Communication, 23 J. APPLIED
COMM. RES. 167, 168 (1995).
462. See Sturm, supra note 388, at 524, 564 (noting importance of “intermediaries”
in solving issues of workplace discrimination and noting need for individuals like
ombudsmen to be individual change agents).
463. 557 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2681-84 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring) (questioning
the constitutionality of race-based disparate impact claims under the equal protection
clause of the U.S. Constitution).
464. In that opinion, Scalia questions whether the disparate impact provisions are
“consistent with the Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection” and notes that the
“war between disparate impact and equal protection will be waged sooner or later.” Id.
at 2682-83.
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They recognize that legal language should reflect the complexities
of the modern economy, flatten hierarchies, and promote positive
social transformation. They demonstrate that the unique identities
of worker-parents should be recognized and that the connections be-
tween autonomy and dependence should be not only acknowledged,
but celebrated.
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APPENDIX
STATE-BY-STATE OVERVIEW OF THE MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS OF
STATE STATUTES THAT REQUIRE SCHOOL INVOLVEMENT LEAVE
State Paid or
Unpaid?
Amount of
Leave?
Who counts as a
“parent”?
Who counts as a
“child”?
California; Cal.
Labor Code
§ 230.7
(disciplinary
leave)
Not
addressed
Not addressed Any “parent or
guardian of a pupil” 465
A pupil suspended for
statutorily defined
behavior466
California; Cal.
Labor Code
§ 230.8
(activities
leave)
Unpaid467 8 hours each
month, but no
more than 40
per year468
A “parent, guardian or
grandparent having
custody” of a child and
working for an em-
ployer with 25 or more
employees at a single
location469
Children in licensed
child care facilities or
in public or private
schools, grades K
through 12470
465466467468469470
465. CAL. LAB. CODE § 230.7(a) (West 2010).
466. Id.; CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900.1(a) (West 2010) ; see also § 48900 (outlining the
statutorily defined behavior).
467. CAL. LAB. CODE § 230.8(b)(1) (West 2010).
468. Id. § 230.8(a)(1).
469. Id.
470. Id.
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State What counts as
a “school
activity”?
What
limitations can
an employer
impose?
What are the
notice or
documentation
requirements?
What are the
school’s
obligations?
CA § 230.7 When requested
by a school
teacher who has
suspended the
pupil471
Not addressed Employee must
give “reasonable
notice” 472
Take into account
“reasonable
factors that may
prevent” a parent
from attending473
CA § 230.8 “activities of the
school or . . . child
day care facility of
any of his or her
children.” 474
Employers can
refuse to allow
parents of the
same child work-
ing at same work-
place to take leave
simultaneously475
Employees must
give “reasonable
notice”; employer
can require
employee to
provide docu-
mentation of
attendance,
as deemed
“appropriate and
reasonable” by
the school476
Give
documentation of
attendance477
471472473474475476477
471. § 230.7(a).
472. Id.
473. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900.1(a) (West 2010).
474. CAL. LAB. CODE § 230.8(a)(1) (West 2010).
475. Id. § 230.8(a)(2).
476. Id. § 230.8(a)(1), (c).
477. Id. § 230.8(c).
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State Paid or
Unpaid?
Amount of
Leave?
Who counts as a
“parent”?
Who counts as a “child”?
Colorado Unpaid478 Up to 18 hours
per year; no
more than 6
hours per
month
(part-time
employees to a
portion)479
A person who is in
a “nonexecutive or
nonsupervisory
capacity [AND]
who is the parent
or legal guardian
of a child” AND
who is not an
independent con-
tractor, domestic
servant, seasonal
worker, or farm
laborer, AND who
is working for an
employer as
defined by the
FMLA.480
Child in K to 12 public,
private, or home-based
school481
478479480481
478. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-13.3-103(5) (2009).
479. Id. § 8-13.3-103(1).
480. Id. § 8-13.3-102(3)-(4); Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §
2611(4)(A) (2006).
481. § 8-13.3-102(3)(a).
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State What counts
as a “school
activity”?
What limitations
can an employer
impose?
What are the
notice or
documentation
requirements?
What are the
school’s
obligations?
CO “Academic
activity”:
“parent teacher
conference” or
“meeting[s]
related to”
statutorily
defined topics
including
special
education,
intervention,
“dropout
prevention[,]
attendance[,]
truancy[,] or
disciplinary
issues” 482
May limit leave to
“no longer than
three hour incre-
ments;” may limit
leave “in cases of
emergency,” or
“situations that
may endanger a
person’s health or
safety” or where
employee absence
would “halt . . .
service or
production”; may
refuse additional
leave under statute
if already providing
leave that could be
used for this
purpose; may agree
with employee to
take paid leave and
work hours of paid
leave during same
week.
Employee is to
make “reasonable
attempt” to
schedule activities
outside work
hours.483
Notice given one
week in advance,
including written
verification from
school, if required;
if emergency,
notice given “as
soon as possible”
with written
verification upon
return to work484
Give written
verification of
“academic activity”;
“make best efforts
to accommodate
the schedules of
employees” 485
482483484485
482. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-13.3-102(1) (2009).
483. Id. § 8-13.3-103(1)(a), (1)(c)-(3), (7)(a).
484. Id. § 8-13.3-103(4).
485. Id. § 8-13.3-103(3)-(4).
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State Paid or
Unpaid?
Amount of
Leave?
Who counts as
a “parent”?
Who counts as a “child”?
District of
Columbia
Unpaid486 24 hours
per year487
Natural parents
and individuals
who have legal
custody or who
act as guardians,
aunts, uncles,
grandparents;
and anyone
married to any of
these488
Not addressed
Hawaii Paid489 2 hours
each for 2
conferences
per child
each year;
travel time
included490
State
employees491
Child in licensed day care
facility or grades K through
12, public or private492
486487488489490491492
486. D.C. CODE § 32-1202(d) (2010).
487. Id. § 32-1202(a).
488. Id. § 32-1201(2).
489. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78-31 (LexisNexis 2009).
490. Id.
491. Id.
492. Id.
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State What counts as
a “school
activity”?
What
limitations can
an employer
impose?
What are the
notice or
documentation
requirements?
What are the
school’s
obligations?
DC “an[y] activity
sponsored by
either a school or
an associated
organization”
including stu-
dent perfor-
mances but not
when child is
spectator493
Can deny
if disrupts
employer’s
business, makes
production or
service “unusually
difficult” 494
Ten days’
advance notice if
reasonably
foreseen495
Not addressed
HI Parent-teacher
conferences496
Can deny if it will
“adversely
interfere” with
work or require
additional costs497
Not addressed Not addressed
493494495496497
493. D.C. CODE § 32-1201(3) (2010).
494. Id. § 32-1202(c).
495. Id. § 32-1202(e).
496. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78-31 (LexisNexis 2009).
497. Id.
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State Paid or
Unpaid?
Amount of
Leave?
Who counts as
a “parent”?
Who counts as a
“child”?
Illinois Unpaid498 8 hours per year;
no more than 4
hours per day499
Employees who
have worked at
least 6 months
part-time for an
employer with
50 or more
employees;
independent
contractors
excluded500
A student enrolled in
primary or secondary
public or private school
in Illinois or in a state
that borders Illinois,
who is a biological,
adopted, foster, step-
child, or legal ward of
employee501
Massachusetts Unpaid502 24 hours per
year (time
encompasses
additional
activities, such
as taking a child
to a doctor’s
appointment)503
Employees as
defined by
FMLA:
employees who
have worked at
least 1250 hours
in the last year
for an employer
with 50 or more
employees in a
75-mile radius504
As defined by FMLA: “a
biological, adopted, or
foster child, a stepchild,
a legal ward, or a child
of a person standing in
loco parentis, who is
(A) under 18 years of
age; or (B) 18 years of
age or older” and
incapacitated505
498499500501502503504505
498. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 147/15(b) (West 2008).
499. Id. 147/15(a).
500. Id. 147/10(a), 147/40.
501. Id. 147/10(c).
502. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 52D(c) (West Supp. 2009).
503. Id. § 52D(b).
504. Id. § 52D(a) (adopting the definition from the Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2) (2006)).
505. Id. §52D(a) (adopting the definition from 29 U.S.C. § 2611(12)).
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State What counts as a
“school activity”?
What limitations
can an employer
impose?
What are the
notice or
documentation
requirements?
What are the
school’s
obligations?
IL “school conferences
or classroom
activities related to
the employee’s
child” if they
“cannot be
scheduled during
nonwork hours” 506
Employee must
consult with
employer to make
sure leave does not
unduly disrupt
operations;
employer can deny
if more than 5% of
workforce would
take visit at same
time; employer
must make “good
faith effort” to
allow employee to
make up work507
7-day advance
written request
before
arrangements are
made; if emer-
gency, no more
than 24-hour
notice can be
required;
must submit
verification of the
“exact time and
date” of visit508
Must have
regular school
hours and
evening hours
for visits if not
emergency; must
notify parents of
school visitation
rights509
MA “school activities
directly related to
the educational
advancement . . .
such as
parent-teacher
conferences or
interviewing for a
new school” 510
Not addressed 7 days’ advance
notice of fore-
seeable leave;
“practicable”
notice otherwise;
“certification” can
be requested511
Not addressed
506507508509510511
506. 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 147/15(a) (West 2008).
507. Id. 147/15(a), 147/20, 147/49.
508. Id. 147/15(a), 147/30.
509. Id. 147/15(c), 147/25.
510. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 52D(b)(1) (West Supp. 2009).
511. Id. § 52D(d)-(e).
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State Paid or
Unpaid?
Amount of
Leave?
Who counts as a
“parent”?
Who counts as a
“child”?
Minnesota Unpaid512 16 hours per
year513
All employees who
have worked at least
part-time
for employer;
independent
contractors not
eligible514
Individual under 18 or
under 20 and still
attending secondary
school515
Nevada
(requested
conference
or
emergency)
Not
addressed
Not
addressed
Any employee who is
a “parent, guardian
or custodian of a
child” 516
Child who has an
emergency or upon
request of private or public
school administrator for a
conference517
Nevada
(activities
leave)
Unpaid518 4 hours per
school year
for each child
enrolled in
public or
private
school519
Any employee who is
“parent, guardian,
or custodian of a
child”  and is work-
ing for an employer
who “has 50 or more
employees for each
working day in each
of 20 or more cal-
endar weeks in the
current calendar
year”520
Child enrolled in public or
private school521
512513514515516517518519520521
512. MINN. STAT. § 181.9412 subdiv. 3 (2009).
513. Id. § 181.9412 subdiv. 2.
514. Id. § 181.9412 subdiv. 2; § 181.9412 subdiv. 1 (limiting the application of the
statutory definition of employee for the purposes of school involvement leave).
515. Id. § 181.940 subdiv. 4.
516. Act effective Aug. 15, 2009, ch. 292, 2009 Nev. Stat. 1246, 1249.
517. Id.
518. Id. § 1.
519. Id.
520. Id.
521. Id. §§ 1, 4.
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State What counts as
a “school
activity”?
What
limitations can
an employer
impose?
What are the
notice or
documentation
requirements?
What are the
school’s
obligations?
MN “school
conferences or
school-related
activities related
to the employee’s
child” that “can-
not be scheduled
during nonwork
hours” 522
Employee
must make
“reasonable”
attempts not to
“disrupt unduly
the operations of
the employer” 523
If foreseeable,
“reasonable”
notice524
Not addressed
NV
(req. conf./
emerg.)
Requested school
conference or
emergency525
Not addressed Not addressed Not addressed
NV
(act. leave)
“Parent-teacher
conferences, . . .
school related
activities during
regular school
hours,” to be
involved at the
school during
regular school
hours, “school
sponsored
events” 526
Increments of 1
hour minimum;
written request
from employee 5
days in advance;
leave at a time
mutually agreed
upon between
employee and
employer527
Provide
documentation
that “during the
time of the leave,
the employee
attended or was
otherwise in-
volved at the
school or school-
related activity”
for statutory
purpose528
Not addressed
522523524525526527528
522. MINN. STAT. § 181.9412 subdiv. 2 (2009).
523. Id.
524. Id.
525. Act effective Aug. 15, 2009, ch. 292, 2009 Nev. Stat. 1246, 1249.
526. Id. § 1.
527. Id.
528. Id.
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State Paid or
Unpaid?
Amount
of Leave?
Who counts as a
“parent”?
Who counts as a
“child”?
North
Carolina
Unpaid529 4 hours
per year530
“[a]ny employee who is
parent, guardian, or
person standing in loco
parentis” 531
“school aged” 532
Rhode Island Unpaid533 10 hours
per year534
Any employee who has
been working 30 hours
per week for a year for
a private employer of
50 or more, or the
state535
Child of a “parent,
foster parent, or
guardian” 536
Tennessee Not
addressed
1 day per
month537
State employees538 “children enrolled in
schools” 539
529530531532533534535536537538539
529. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.3(b) (2009).
530. Id. § 95-28.3(a).
531. Id.
532. Id.
533. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-48-12(c) (2010).
534. Id.§ 28-48-12(a).
535. Id. §§ 28-48-1(2)-(3), 28-48-12(a).
536. Id. § 28-48-12(a).
537. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-7001(b)(5) (2009).
538. Id.
539. Id.
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State What counts
as a “school
activity”?
What
limitations can
an employer
impose?
What are the
notice or
documentation
requirements?
What are the
school’s
obligations?
NC For the purpose
of being
“involved” in
child’s school540
Time must be
mutually agreed
upon541
Employer may
require 48 hours’
advanced notice;
employer may
request
verification542
Not addressed
RI “school
conferences or
other school-
related
activities” 543
Employee must
make reasonable
effort not to
unduly disrupt
employer’s
business544
Not addressed Not addressed
TN Activities
related to the
“educational
and teaching
process” that
“enables the
parent to more
fully observe
and understand
the school, the
faculty, the
students and
the educational
and teaching
activities” 545
Department or
“immediate
supervisor” must
approve leave546
Not addressed School shall provide
documentation
verifying
participation if
employee requests547
540541542543544545546547
540. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-28.3(a) (2009).
541. Id. § 95-28.3(a)(1).
542. Id. § 95-28.3(a)(2).
543. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-48-12(a) (2010).
544. Id. § 28-48-12(b).
545. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-7001(b)(1)-(2) (2009).
546. Id. § 49-6-7001(b)(5).
547. Id.
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State Paid or
Unpaid?
Amount of
Leave?
Who counts as
a “parent”?
Who counts as a “child”?
Texas Paid
(through
use of sick
leave)548
8 hours per
year549
State employees
only550
“child who is a student
attending a grade from
prekindergarten through
12th grade” 551
Vermont Unpaid552 24 hours per
year (time
encompasses
additional
activities, such
as taking a
child to a
doctor’s
appointment)553
Any employee
who works an
average of thirty
hours a week a
year for an
employer with 15
or more full-time
employees554
“employee’s child, stepchild,
foster child or ward who lives
with the employee” 555
548549550551552553554555
548. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 661.206 (Vernon 2004).
549. Id. § 661.206(b).
550. Id. § 661.201, .206.
551. Id. § 661.206(a).
552. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 472a(a) (2010).
553. Id.
554. Id. § 471(3).
555. Id. § 472a(a)(1).
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State What counts as
a “school
activity”?
What limitations
can an employer
impose?
What are the
notice or
documentation
requirements?
What are the
school’s
obligations?
TX Parent- teacher
conferences556
Not addressed Required to give
advance notice557
Not addressed
VT “preschool or
school activities
directly related to
the academic
educational
advancement . . .
such as parent-
teacher
conference” 558
Can require no less
than 2-hour
increments;
employees must
make a “reasonable
attempt” to
schedule during
nonwork hours559
7 days’ notice,
except in
emergency560
Not addressed
556557558559560
556. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 661.206(b) (Vernon 2004).
557. Id. § 661.206(c).
558. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 472a(a)(1) (2010).
559. Id. § 472a(a)-(b).
560. Id. § 472a(b).
